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INTRODUCTION
T HE internationalization of the world's securities markets has be-
come a well-established phenomenon. By the end of 1997, more
than 1,000 foreign companies were traded in U.S. public markets.' In
the United Kingdom, the daily foreign equity turnover is over 50% of
the total daily turnover; in the United States, the daily foreign equity
turnover has been increasing rapidly since the beginning of the 1990s.1
Investors are increasingly diversifying their portfolio between several
markets. In 1996, the gross purchases and sales of securities in the
United States by foreign investors amounted to more than $12.4
trillion.3
Although the nature of the world's securities markets has changed
dramatically, there have been no corresponding changes in the way
these markets are regulated. This paper presents an alternative to the
1. Office of International Corporate Finance of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Foreign Companies Registered and Reporting with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (Dec. 31, 1997).
2. G. Andrew Karolyi, What Happens to Stocks that List Shares Abroad? A Sur-
vey of the Evidence and its Managerial Implications, NYSE Working Paper 96-04,
Sept. 1996, at 36.
3. Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Bulletin, table
CM-V-5 (March 1997).
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current regulatory regimes of the securities markets. The paper sug-
gests the replacement of the prevailing domestic disclosure regulatory
regimes with unified disclosure standards to be used by domestic and
foreign issuers in all developed markets. Such a transformation would
result in a more efficient securities market, a significant reduction in
the cost of equity, and a higher level of investor protection
worldwide.4
This proposal describes the scope of the suggested common stan-
dards, the steps regulators will need to take to agree upon unified
standards, the content of those standards, and the mechanism for their
implementation. The timing of this proposal is important. In July
1997, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") and
the regulators of all major securities markets announced their inten-
tion to replace the registration system for cross-border offerings with
international disclosure standards developed within the framework of
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 5
This article also addresses the issues raised in the IOSCO proposal
and provides an alternative concept. 6
Part I of this article describes and evaluates two existing models of
harmonization, the European Union (EU) harmonization plan and
the United States-Canadian Multijurisdictional Disclosure System
(MJDS). Both models are based on the concept of mutual recogni-
tion, but differ in method of implementation and other details. The
conclusions drawn from this evaluation are incorporated in the pro-
posed harmonization model discussed in parts II and III.
Part II explores the preferred form of harmonization of securities
disclosure rules. The discussion begins with an analysis of two possi-
ble approaches to harmonization: reciprocity and commonality, while
arguing for the superiority of the commonality approach. The discus-
sion continues with the scope of the proposed standards, the structure
4. See, e.g., Ui Geiger, The Case for the Harmonization of Securities Disclosure
Rules in the Global Market, 1997 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 241 (utilizing various economic
theories to support the argument that harmonization is the most efficient approach
for regulating securities disclosure rules in the global market).
5. The international disclosure standards [hereinafter the IOSCO Proposal] are
accompanied by a proposed timetable based upon endorsement of the IOSCO Propo-
sal by the member states by fall 1998, and thereafter implementation of the standards
into the domestic law of the member states, including the U.S. (on file with the au-
thor). See also U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Current Issues and
Rulemaking Projects (visited Feb. 25, 1998) <http'J/www.se.govlrulesIotherI
cfcr0298.htmbl> (describing the development of international standards and the
rulemaking process).
6. The concept of the IOSCO Proposal is different from that of this paper. The
IOSCO Proposal does not call for the harmonization of securities disclosure rules;
instead, it suggests the creation of international disclosure standards to be used only
for cross-border offering and listing. For further discussion of the conceptual differ-
ences, see infra part II.B.
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of the Global Prospectus 7 and its review process. Finally, this part
addresses the institutional framework of the model, focusing on the
process of creating, implementing, monitoring, and changing the har-
monized standards. The need for a central body with decision-mak-
ing, monitoring and dispute-resolution mechanisms (a Global
Coordinator) is illustrated by the experiences of various multinational
economic cooperation bodies.
Part III presents the content of the proposed standards. This dis-
cussion is based upon a comprehensive analysis of the disclosure rules
in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and eleven other
markets. This part specifies the disclosure rules which are to be the
core of the Global Prospectus. Although not a complete disclosure
code, these rules cover all aspects of the issuer's development and the
description of its business.
Finally, part IV identifies some of the problems which are likely to
hinder the process of harmonization. The discussion covers the cost of
governmental intervention, differences in structural and regulatory
schemata in different markets, the costs of moving from the current
disclosure regime to harmonization and political opposition to harmo-
nization by interest groups. The analysis of these problems is followed
by suggestions as to how to avoid them or mitigate their negative
effects.
I. EXISTING MODELS OF HARMONIZATION
Over the last two decades, we have witnessed the implementation
of two major plans to harmonize securities disclosure rules: the EU
harmonization plan and the MJDS. Under the EU plan, a single dis-
closure document can be used for the offering of securities in any
member state, as long as the disclosure requirements mandated by the
issuer's home country conform to a minimum standard. In contrast,
the MJDS allows Canadian and U.S. issuers to satisfy each other's
registration and disclosure requirements by complying with their own
domestic requirements. Before presenting any new proposal concern-
ing harmonization, it is important to analyze these two models.
A. The EU Harmonization Plan
The EU's harmonization of securities laws is part of its plan to cre-
ate a common market in Europe.8 Several directives 9 govern the re-
gistration and admission for the trading of securities to be listed on a
7. The term "Global Prospectus" is used to describe the prospectus which would
be prepared pursuant to the harmonized standards.
8. Andreas J. Roquette, New Developments Relating to the Internationalization of
the Capital Markets: A Comparison of Legislative Reforms in the United States, the
European Community, and Germany, 14 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 565, 571 (1994).
9. Directives are rules adopted by the EU Council which must be implemented
by legislation into each member state's domestic law. Id. at 587-88.
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stock exchange in a member state; the sale of securities offered to the
public without listing, periodic reporting requirements; and mutual
recognition of offering documents.
1. The Basic Approach of the EU Harmonization Plan
The EU harmonization plan is based upon minimum disclosure
standards combined with a mutual recognition approach. The direc-
tives set only a minimum standard, which each member state may sup-
plement with more stringent rules appropriate to the specific needs of
its own markets. 10 Each member state is required to recognize disclo-
sure documents which meet the minimum standards and are approved
by a competent authority in another member state.1 The minimum
standards ensure a level of disclosure which is acceptable to all mem-
ber states, making it possible for states with more stringent regulatory
regimes to accept registration documents based on the home country
requirements of any other member state."2
2. Directives Governing Issuing and Trading in Securities
Issuing and trading in securities in the EU are governed by five di-
rectives.3 The Admissions Directive,"4 adopted in 1979, specifies the
minimum requirements for the admission of securities for trading on a
stock exchange in any member state. The Listing Particular Direc-
tive,'5 adopted in 1980, defines the minimum disclosure requirements
for registration documents to be used in any member state. Informa-
tion required for an equity offering is specified in schedule A, 6 which
mandates the disclosure of information concerning the parties in-
volved in the offering, the issuer's business and management, and fi-
nancial statements. In addition, article four of the Listing Particular
Directive mandates the disclosure of material information which is
"necessary to enable investors and their investment advisers to make
10. David Reid & Andrew Ballheimer, The Legal Framework of the Securities In-
dustry in the European Conmunity Under the 1992 Program, 29 Colum. 1. Transnat'l
L. 103, 124 (1991) (describing the development of the EU harmonization program).
11. For a discussion of the mutual recognition procedure, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 18-19.
12. See Joel P. Trachtman, Unilateralisn, Bilateralism, Regionalism, Multilateral-
ism and Functionalism" A Comparison with Reference to Securities Regulation, 4
Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 69, 96 (1994).
13. Due to the nature and scope of this work, only the Listing Particular Directive
and the Mutual Recognition Directive are discussed in detail. For a comprehensive
discussion of all of the directives which relate to the issuance of and trading in securi-
ties in the EU, see Manning Gilbert Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities
Laws: The Achievements of the European Communities, 31 Harv. Int'l l.J. 185, 209-
21 (1990).
14. Council Directive No. 79/279, 1979 OJ. (L 66) 21 [hereinafter the Admissions
Directive].
15. Council Directive No. 80/390, 1980 OJ. (L 100) 1 [hereinafter the Listing Par-
ticular Directive].
16. Id. at (L 100) 11.
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an informed assessment of the assets and liabilities, financial position,
profits and losses, and prospects of the issuer and of the rights attach-
ing to such securities.' ' 7
The Listing Particular Directive was amended in 1987 by the Mu-
tual Recognition Directive.'" The Mutual Recognition Directive pro-
vides that listing particulars which are approved by a competent
authority in any member state must be recognized in all other member
states if the application for listing is made simultaneously or within a
short interval. 19 Mutual recognition is not required if an exemption
from the requirements of the Listing Particular has been granted in
the member state where the particular was scrutinized, and such an
exemption is not allowed in the member state where mutual recogni-
tion is sought.
The Interim Reports Directive,2" adopted in 1982, mandates the
publication of semi-annual reports by all issuers with equity securities
listed on a stock exchange in a member state.2' Finally, the Public
Offer Prospectus Directive, adopted in 1989, specifies the minimum
disclosure requirements for public offerings of securities which are not
to be listed on an exchange. 2 The Public Offer Prospectus Directive
includes a mutual recognition provision similar to the one added to
the Listing Particular Directive.
3. Evaluation of the EU's Experience
The EU harmonization plan serves as a good case study for the ap-
plicability and effectiveness of harmonized disclosure rules. It is the
first attempt to harmonize securities disclosure rules among separate
nations. The EU has sought to achieve a common market for securi-
ties using minimum standards for the listing of securities and mutual
recognition of disclosure documents. This approach, however, suffers
from several problems. The minimum standards approach, which al-
lows member states to set more stringent disclosure requirements, can
result in regulatory disharmony and disparities among member
states.23 These disparities potentially lead to regulatory arbitrage
within the EU. Issuers may prefer to seek approval of their listing
17. Id. at (L 100) 2.
18. Council Directive No. 87/345, 1987 O.J. (L 185) 81 [hereinafter Mutual Recog-
nition Directive].
19. Mutual recognition is subject only to translation and the incorporation of lim-
ited additional information concerning tax systems, paying agents, and the way no-
tices are to be delivered to investors in the member state where recognition is sought.
Id. at (L 185) 82.
20. Council Directive No. 82/121, 1982 O.J. (L 48) 26.
21. The requirements for the publication of an annual report are listed in the
Fourth Company Law Directive which applies to every company incorporated within
the EU. See Council Directive No. 78/660, 1978 O.J. (L 222) 11.
22. Council Directive No. 98/298, 1989 O.J. (L 124) 8.
23. Warren, supra note 13, at 231 (stating that the EU chose "harmony now" at
the price of "discord later").
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document in a nation which offers a less rigid disclosure regime, and
then use the Mutual Recognition Directive to obtain listing in other
nations. This puts pressure on member states to reduce their disclo-
sure requirements to the lowest common denominator.24 The fear of
regulatory arbitrage has already led the London Stock Exchange
(LSE) to reduce its disclosure requirements to the EU's minimum
standard.'
Another source of potential disparities is the method by which
member states have interpreted, implemented, and enforced the di-
rectives. Since the directives do not mandate any particular method
of implementation, each member state may interpret and implement
the directives differently. Thus, even when disclosure requirements
are formally harmonized, in practice there are still differences in regu-
latory requirements.26 The lack of uniformity in implementation and
enforcement of the directives is exacerbated by the lack of an institu-
tional mechanism for coordination and enforcement of the rules. Sev-
eral commentators have pointed to the lack of such an institution as a
major obstacle to the creation of a common market for securities in
Europe.27
B. The United States-Canadian Multijurisdictional
Disclosure System
The MJDS, adopted in 1991, employs a reciprocal approach to facil-
itate United States/Canadian cross-border securities transactions2 8
The MJDS is the first attempt by United States regulators to allow
foreign issuers to access the United States public market using their
home country disclosure documents. The MJDS was designed to
serve as a model for future arrangements with other nations.29 Thus,
it is important to analyze the concept and content of the MJDS and to
draw conclusions from the American and Canadian experience accu-
mulated since its adoption.
24. Id at 213 (exploring the mutual influence of the minimum standards and the
mutual recognition approach).
25. Reid & Ballheimer, supra note 10, at 126 (describing how the LSE relaxed its
listing requirements).
26. Id. at 144.
27. See eg., Roquette, supra note 8, at 598 (stating that the lack of an institutional
mechanism for coordination and enforcement reduces the chance for efficient and
effective harmonization); Warren supra note 13, at 231 (suggesting the establishment
of a supernational regulatory body to ensure the coordination and enforcement of the
regulatory system).
28. Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration
and Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6902, [1991
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,812, at 81,860 (July 1, 1991) [hereinaf-
ter the MJDS Release].
29. When adopting the MJDS, the SEC indicated its intention to extend it to other
foreign countries such as the United Kingdom and Japan. See Edward E. Green et. al.,
U.S. Regulation of the International Securities and Derivatives Markets 8-5 (3d ed.
1995).
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1. Concept and Content of the MJDS
The basic concept of the MJDS is similar to that of the EU harmo-
nization plan. The United States and Canada have agreed to mutually
recognize registration statements prepared in accordance with each
other's domestic disclosure requirements. The MJDS has not formally
established a minimum standard similar to the one established by the
EU. During the negotiation of the MJDS, however, Canadian author-
ities adopted new rules which made Canadian disclosure requirements
substantially equal to those of the United States °.3  Furthermore, fol-
lowing the adoption of the MJDS, the Canadian securities regime has
become increasingly aligned with that of the United States.31 Today,
Canadian authorities are quick to adopt new United States initiatives,
making Canadian issuers which do not use the MJDS subject to
American style disclosure.32
To be eligible to use the MJDS for equity offerings, a Canadian is-
suer has to satisfy three basic conditions:33 (1) a twelve month report-
ing history in Canada; (2) a public float of seventy-five million U.S.
dollars; and (3) full United States GAAP reconciliation. Eligible Ca-
nadian issuers may conduct a public offering in the United States, us-
ing a Canadian prospectus under a "wrap-around" registration
statement on Form F-10. 4 The prospectus, however, must include all
"material" information within the definition of U.S. securities laws.35
Furthermore, issuers and underwriters remain subject to civil liability
under U.S. antifraud provisions for misstatements and omissions of
material information.36 Once cleared with a review jurisdiction in
Canada, the prospectus is not subject to review in the United States
unless the SEC has reason to believe that there are deficiencies in the
filing.37
2. Evaluation of the MJDS Experience
The first conclusion to draw from the experience of the adoption of
the MJDS is that the harmonization of securities disclosure standards,
even between two nations whose economies are strongly connected,
requires a long process of negotiation and modification of existing
30. Id. at 8-3 to 8-4 n.1 (explaining how the equality of Canadian and U.S. require-
ments was achieved).
31. Cally Jordan, Regulation of Canadian Capital Markets in the 1990s: The United
States in the Driver's Seat, 4 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 577, 592 (1995).
32. Id. at 592-93 (describing the Americanization of the Canadian disclosure
system).
33. For a full discussion of the conditions for using the MJDS, see Green, supra
note 29, at 8-6 to 8-12.
34. 17 C.F.R. § 239.40 (1997).
35. The MJDS Release, supra note 28, at 81,880-81.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 81,866.
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rules.38 Formally based on a reciprocal approach, the MJDS is, in fact,
based upon many changes in the Canadian disclosure regime which
make it almost identical to that of the United States. It may be the
reluctance of other nations to engage in a similar process of Ameri-
canization of their securities disclosure rules which has prevented the
planned expansion of the MJDS to the United Kingdom and Japan. 39
Even between the United States and Canada, the lack of common ac-
counting standards, reflected in the requirement to reconcile financial
statements in an equity offering, limits the effectiveness of the MJDS
for equity. As a result of the reconciliation requirement, only a small
amount of equity has been raised using the MJDS.40 Finally, the re-
tention of U.S. civil liability for the MJDS prospectus has resulted in
the MJDS prospectus becoming very similar to the U.S. prospectus"
and in underwriters insisting on a U.S. style due diligence process.42
11 THE FoRM, ScoPE AND PROCESS OF HARMONIZATION
This part discusses three basic issues which need to be addressed
before drafting the harmonized standards. First, it is essential to de-
cide which form of harmonization would be more efficient for the har-
monization of securities disclosure rules in the global market:
reciprocity or commonality.43 Next, it is necessary to determine the
structure and use of these standards. Finally, the form and powers of
the institution which would coordinate the creation of and the changes
to the harmonization standards and monitor their implementation
have to be determined.
A. Reciprocity or Commonality
Harmonization usually refers to two different forms of legal order:
reciprocity and commonality." The reciprocity approach is based
upon deference to the standards of other jurisdictions. Reciprocity
38. The development of the MJDS took six years, see Green, supra note 29, at 8-3
n.1.
39. An additional reason might be the fact that until 1997 the United Kingdom
securities market was regulated by a private organization (the LSE) which the SEC
did not find to be an appropriate contra party for multinational disclosure agreement.
40. As of March 1995, only $3 billion had been raised in MJDS equity offerings.
In contrast, $13 billion had been raised in MJDS debt offerings. See Green, supra
note 29, at 8-39 to 8-40 nn.112 & 114.
41. Jordan, supra note 31, at 591.
42. Trachtman, supra note 12, at 95.
43. A similar pattern was followed by the SEC when it initiated the development
of the MJDS. The first step was the publication of a concept release requesting com-
ments on two alternative approaches to facilitate multinational offerings: the recipro-
cal approach and the common prospectus approach. See Facilitation of Multinational
Securities Offering, Securities Act Release No. 6568, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,743, at 87,318 (Feb. 28, 1985) [hereinafter Multinational
Offerings Release].
44. Warren, supra note 13, at 191.
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requires an agreement by each of the participating countries that an
offering document used by issuers in their own countries will be ac-
cepted for offering in each of the other countries.45 Reciprocity is
usually limited to situations in which there is a strong economic con-
nection among all the countries involved, and all meet some minimum
standards.46 Commonality involves the modification or replacement
of domestic rules with rules that are substantially the same as those of
other countries. 47 In our context, commonality would require agree-
ment on disclosure standards for an offering document that could be
used in all participating countries.48
The reciprocity approach is considered easier to implement because
it only requires the acceptance of a document based on the domestic
requirements of another nation.49 Pure reciprocity without minimum
standards, however, would not be acceptable to most nations. It is
very hard to imagine that the United States would ever accept a pro-
spectus based on the disclosure requirements of a third world country
or even those of Japan or Germany. Furthermore, unless it results in
the lowest common denominator,50 reciprocity does not minimize the
disparities between nations or enhance the comparability of invest-
ment opportunities. If the standards of many nations were accepted
in one market, it would be difficult for investors to compare their in-
vestment opportunities. This lack of comparability would hinder the
efficient flow of capital worldwide. 51 The experience with the EU har-
monization plan52 and the MJDS,53 both of which are based on a re-
ciprocal approach, proves that the reciprocal approach cannot serve as
a basis for global harmonization. The EU tried to avoid the problems
of reciprocity by adopting minimum standards. This led to opportuni-
ties for regulatory arbitrage and a reduction of the disclosure level in
the member states to the lowest common denominator. The lesson
from this experience is that if we are to end up with the lowest com-
mon denominator anyway, we would be better off designing a com-
mon optimal standard (i.e., the commonality approach) to begin with.
45. Multinational Offerings Release, supra note 43, at 87,322.
46. James D. Cox, Rethinking U.S. Securities Laws in the Shadow of International
Regulatory Competition, 55 Law & Contemp. Probs. 157, 179 (1992) (describing situa-
tions in which the United States should defer to other countries' securities regula-
tions); Warren, supra note 13, at 191-93 (describing the use of reciprocity in EU
harmonization and in connection with the MJDS).
47. Warren, supra note 13, at 191-92.
48. For the names of the countries that would participate in the harmonization
process, see infra note 59.
49. Multinational Offerings Release, supra note 43, at 87,323.
50. See supra text accompanying note 24.
51. The IASC-U.S. Comparison Project: A Report on the Similarities and Differ-
ences Between IASC Standards and U.S. GAAP 4 (Carrie Bloomer ed., 1996) (stat-
ing that reciprocity introduces noncomparability and precludes firms from competing
on a level playing field) [hereinafter IASC-U.S. Comparison Project].
52. See supra part I.A.
53. See supra part I.B.
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With respect to the MJDS, such a system can work only between two
countries with very similar reporting systems. Moreover, although
Canada and the United States had a similar disclosure system even
before the adoption of the MJDS, the Canadian disclosure system
went through significant changes during the negotiation of the MJDS
to make its disclosure even more similar to that of the United States.
The retention of U.S. civil liability has further made the MJDS Pro-
spectus similar to the U.S. Prospectus. The MJDS, although formally
based on reciprocity, is truly based on a commonality approach. The
MJDS has resulted in the Americanization of Canadian securities
laws, a result which would not be acceptable to many nations.
In contrast to reciprocity, the advantages of commonality outweigh
its disadvantages. 4 Economies of scale would be created by standard-
izing a single set of rules to govern primary and periodic disclosure.
Investors, analysts, accountants, and lawyers would only need to learn
how to deal with a single set of rules, rather than multiple sets, as is
now the case. s5  A common prospectus would also make possible a
much more systematic comparison of companies in different markets,
the ultimate result of which would be more efficient financial mar-
kets.56 Finally, a common prospectus would make possible the devel-
opment of an international database to be used for secondary
offerings and trading.57
An agreement on a common prospectus with high quality disclosure
might be difficult to achieve. The experience with the EU harmoniza-
tion plan and MJDS, however, has shown that the same problem ap-
plies to reciprocity, which requires the adoption of minimum
standards-such as those adopted by the EU-or the creation of simi-
lar disclosure standards-as in the MJDS. The feasibility of the crea-
54. For a detailed discussion of the benefits of common standards, see Geiger,
supra note 4, at 297-312.
55. See Lawrence J. White, Competition Versus Harmonization - An Overview of
International Regulation of Financial Services, in International Financial Markets:
Harmonization Versus Competition 5, 39 (Claude E. Barfield ed., 1996) (describing
the savings in transaction costs that would result from harmonization and comparing
the diversity of disclosure rules to a situation in which each of the 50 states had its
own accounting standards); Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition,
Externalization, and Jurisdiction, 34 Harv. Int'l LJ. 47, 66-67 (1993) (describing the
economies of scale which are created when one set of rules governs a broad class of
transactions); David Mercado, Evolving Accounting Standards in the International
Markets, 961 PL/CORP 343, 348 (1996), available in Westlaw, PLI-CORP File (ex-
plaining how investors' and analysts' familiarity with one international standard facili-
tates the ease with which they understand the disclosure document).
56. See Richard C. Breeden, Foreign Companies and U.S. Securities Markets in a
7une of Economic Transformation, 17 Fordham Int'l LI. S77, S88-S89 (1994) (ex-
plaining the importance of comparability); Mercado, supra note 55, at 348 (explaining
that having one set of standards will make possible a much more systematic compari-
son of companies around the world).
57. Multinational Offerings Release, supra note 43, at 87,323.
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tion of high quality unified standards is demonstrated in part III of
this work.58
B. The Scope of the Common Standards
If the commonality approach is to be used to regulate the global
securities market, it is essential to define the scope of the common
standards. The first question in this regard is in which nations would
the common standards be applicable? This proposal recommends a
two step process. In the first stage, the common standards would apply
only to a relatively small group of developed nations. 9 Most devel-
oped nations have a sophisticated investment community, an estab-
lished financial industry, and an experienced accounting and legal
community. This makes them most suitable to share common stan-
dards. Furthermore, an attempt to develop and implement common
standards by a much larger group of nations might be impossible. Fi-
nally, since the proposed review process of the Global Prospectus an-
ticipates mutual recognition of documents reviewed by the domestic
regulatory authorities of all participating nations,6" it is unlikely that
the developed nations would agree to the participation of all inter-
ested nations in the first stage. In the second stage, other nations
which decided to adopt the common standards would become part of
the Global Coordinator, subject to the approval of the decision-mak-
ing institution of the Global Coordinator.6'
A second limitation on the applicability of the standards is that they
would not apply to small offerings by companies with limited market
capitalization. Many nations allow exemptions from registration for
small offerings.62 The main justification for this exemption is that in a
small offering, the registration costs are spread over the small amount
of capital raised, and are much higher than the cost of registration for
a large offering. Without the exemption, many small companies
would not be able to access the public market. In the context of the
Global Prospectus, small companies, especially those which transact
business domestically, or do not anticipate that foreign investors will
58. IOSCO Proposal, supra note 5, although not meant to replace domestic disclo-
sure requirements, is another example of the feasibility of creating an agreed upon
international standard.
59. The following nations which are currently involved in the creation of interna-
tional disclosure standards within the framework of IOSCO are potential candidates
for participation in the first stage of harmonization: Australia, Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States [hereinafter "Major
Markets"].
60. See infra text accompanying notes 78-80.
61. For a discussion of the voting mechanism of the Global Coordinator, see infra
part II.D.2.
62. In the U.S., certain non-reporting issuers can raise up to $5 million in aggre-
gate during any 12 month period without registration. See Regulation A - Condi-
tional Small Issuers Exemption, 17 C.F.R. § § 230.251-63 (1997).
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find them attractive, might find it too expensive to disclose informa-
tion in accordance with the common standards. Consequently, do-
mestic offerings below a minimum threshold by companies with a
limited market capitalization would be exempt from the disclosure re-
quirements of the Global Prospectus. In addition, certain exemptions
from the common periodic reporting obligations would be available
for small companies which did not list their securities on a national
exchange or quotation system.63 Those small companies would be
subject to domestic rules, which would either exempt them completely
from registration, or require a more lax disclosure. Finally, notwith-
standing the exemption, exempt companies could elect to voluntarily
report in accordance with the requirements of the Global Prospectus,
and in so doing, increase their exposure to the international invest-
ment community.
Perhaps the most relevant question in connection with the scope of
the common standards is whether the common standards should be
used for every securities offering, including purely domestic ones (a
global standard), or only for multinational offerings.' The IOSCO
proposal takes the latter approach, suggesting the establishment of in-
ternational disclosure standards to be used only for multinational of-
ferings.65 For both issuers and investors, however, this approach is
less beneficial than the establishment of a global standard. From an
issuer's perspective, a global standard is likely to result in more signifi-
cant savings in transaction costs. The ability to use the same docu-
ment for both domestic and international offerings would significantly
reduce the cost of multinational offerings. Furthermore, issuers would
realize an ongoing savings of periodic disclosure costs by using the
same disclosure standards in both domestic and foreign markets. ' In
contrast, by having to use different standards for domestic and mul-
tinational offerings, issuers which offered securities outside their home
markets would bear multiple disclosure costs. Issuers in countries-
such as the United States-where domestic standards are more strin-
gent than the international standards, might be put at a competitive
disadvantage. U.S. issuers might argue that disclosure has costs, and
that if foreign issuers did not have to supply certain types of informa-
tion or comprehensive periodic reporting to their American investors,
why should American issuers be required to supply this informa-
63. The specific details of these exemptions are to be determined in the negotia-
tion process.
64. Unless otherwise stated, the term "multinational offering" refers to an offering
or listing of securities conducted in one or more markets other than the issuer's home
market.
65. See supra note 5. One should note, however, that the IOSCO Proposal can
serve as a first step toward a full scale harmonization.
66. For a detailed description of issuers' benefits from harmonization, see Geiger,
supra note 4, at 306-07.
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tion?67 Finally, having different domestic and international standards
would make it impossible to use a short form registration procedure
based on home country disclosure in multinational offerings.68
From the investors' perspective, the use of one standard for foreign
companies and another for domestic companies would result in non-
comparability. Investors would face a difficult task in trying to over-
come qualitative differences in the information presented by foreign
and domestic firms.69 Using different standards for foreign and do-
mestic companies would also hinder investors' ability to compare
companies' risk-return characteristics across the markets.70 Further-
more, if the standards are to be used only for multinational offerings,
investors would still have to become familiar with many forms of dis-
closure documents when investing in foreign markets. In contrast, the
use of one document in all markets would create significant econo-
mies of scale, improve comparability, and result in a more efficient
allocation of capital.7 ' A global standard could also confer the bene-
fits of an efficient disclosure system upon a large body of investors and
improve disclosure efficiency in many markets where local standards
are currently suboptimal.72
The last recommendation regarding the scope of the common stan-
dards focuses on industry-specific disclosure. In some countries, spe-
cific rules apply to companies in industries such as oil and gas,
banking, real estate, and mining.73 In many instances, the develop-
ment and content of those rules reflect the importance of a specific
industry to the economy of a country. However, because specific in-
dustries have varying levels of importance in different countries, and
in order to facilitate the process of developing the new common rules,
no specific industry guidelines would be instituted in the first stage of
harmonization.
67. See Breeden, supra note 56, at S88 (arguing that having lower disclosure stan-
dards for foreign issuers might put U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage); Louis
Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What
You Measure, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1335, 1338 (1996) (arguing that if the SEC lowers
standards radically for foreign issuers, domestic issuers will demand equal treatment).
68. A short form cross-border registration procedure based upon domestic disclo-
sure was adopted in the EU in 1994. See Council Directive No. 94/18, 1994 O.J. (L
135) 1.
69. IASC-U.S. Comparison Project, supra note 51, at 5. In fact, even investors
who invest only in local markets would have to bear the costs of becoming familiar
with the international disclosure standards which would be used by foreign issuers in
the investors' domestic market.
70. Breeden, supra note 56, at S88-S89.
71. See Geiger, supra note 4, at 307-10 (showing how the harmonization could
significantly reduce the cost of capital and improve comparability).
72. Id. at 309-10 (explaining how using harmonized standards would improve the
operation of markets worldwide).
73. See, e.g., Securities Act Industry Guides, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 3825-31,
at 3311 (July 15, 1996) (stating specific disclosure requirements for certain industries).
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C. The Global Prospectus
1. The Structure of the Global Prospectus
The Global Prospectus would be based on two forms: a Basic Form
to be used by companies that do not offer or list their securities in
foreign markets, and a Global Form for multinational offerings. The
Basic Form would include a complete description of the issuer's busi-
ness, management, securities, and the details of the offering.74 The
Basic Form would also include financial statements prepared in ac-
cordance with the reformed International Accounting Standards
(IAS)
For a multinational offering, an issuer would have to use the Global
Form, which would be a "wrap-around" of a translation of the Basic
Form into the language of each market in which public offerings are to
be conducted.76 In addition, the Global Form would include specific
information concerning investments by investors from each host mar-
ket in the issuer's home market as well as any material changes in the
issuer's position since the date of authorization of the Basic Form.'
2. The Review Process of the Global Prospectus
In order to realize the full benefits of harmonization, there is a need
to coordinate the review process among the participating nations.
Clearing the same document with each jurisdiction in which securities
are to be offered is complicated and impractical. A multiple review
process would hinder the offering process, making it slow and expen-
sive. Instead, each nation would designate a competent authority
which would be entrusted wvith reviewing the Global Prospectus.78
This authority would review all Basic Forms filed by domestic issuers.
This would be done even for purely offshore offerings of domestic is-
suers. There are multiple reasons for this process. First, a local au-
thority would have more experience with and possess a better
understanding of the operation of domestic firms than a foreign au-
thority would. Second, a local authority is more accessible to domes-
tic issuers, making the clearance of documents with a local authority
74. For a detailed discussion of the content of the Global Prospectus, see infra part
HI.
75. For a description of the LAS and a comparison of the new standards with U.S.
GAAP, see IASC-U.S. Comparison Project, supra note 51 (presenting a study pre-
pared by the Financial Accounting Standards Board).
76. There will be no need to translate a Basic Form prepared in English if the
competent authority in the host market authorizes the use of English language pro-
spectuses in cross-border offerings. The term "host market" refers to any market,
other than the issuer's home market, in which securities are publicly offered.
77. For a discussion of the additional information to be provided in the Global
Form, see infra part III.D.2.
78. The need to rely on the review process of other authorities is another justifica-
tion for limiting the applicability of the proposed rules to developed markets, which
are supervised by reliable regulatory bodies. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
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faster and cheaper. Finally, allowing issuers to designate a review ju-
risdiction, as in the MJDS and EU harmonization plan,79 would en-
courage regulatory arbitrage. Issuers might choose authorities which
are known for their less strict review process.
A Basic Form reviewed and authorized by a competent authority
would be acceptable for public offering in any other, participating ju-
risdiction within three months of the authorization."0 The additional
information in the Global Form and the translation of the Basic Form,
if necessary, would be reviewed by the competent authority of each
host market. This authority would have a greater understanding of
the specific needs of investors from its own market which would be
reflected in the Global Form. Furthermore, within the period pro-
vided for the review of the Global Form, the competent authority of
the host market would be able to determine whether to use its right to
require a full review process as discussed below.
Each jurisdiction would have the right to require a full review of the
Basic Form by its own competent authority if it had reasonable
grounds to believe that the competent authority of the issuer's home
country was not complying with the harmonized standards or that
there were problems with the filing. This safety mechanism would be
required because we could not expect regulatory agencies, such as the
SEC, to completely waive their right to review disclosure documents
to be used in their territory."' Disputes concerning the application,
interpretation, and review process of the Global Prospectus would be
brought before the dispute-resolution mechanism of the Global
Coordinator.s"
D. The Global Coordinator
The harmonization of securities disclosure rules would be achieved
through the cooperation of domestic regulatory agencies within the
framework of an international regulatory body-the Global Coordi-
nator. This organization would also monitor the implementation, in-
terpretation, and enforcement of the unified standards by domestic
regulators.8 3 The Global Coordinator would not replace domestic
79. For U.S.-only offerings, the MJDS allows Canadian issuers to designate any
review jurisdiction in Canada. Green, supra note 29, at 8.02[2]. In the EU, when an
offering is conducted in several markets outside of the issuer's home market, the is-
suer can engage in regulatory arbitrage by choosing a "convenient" competent au-
thority to conduct the review process. See Warren, supra note 13, at 213.
80. In the Global Form, issuers would have to disclose any material changes from
the date of authorization of the Basic Form until the date the Global Form goes into
effect in the host market. See infra text accompanying note 247.
81. The idea of local regulatory authorities relying on a foreign authority's review
process is likely to raise resistance by many organizations. For a discussion of this
issue, see infra text accompanying notes 306-08.
82. For a discussion of the dispute-resolution mechanism, see infra part II.D.3.
83. The leading candidate to serve as the "Global Coordinator" is the IOSCO.
The IOSCO is a private organization encompassing representatives of securities regu-
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regulators, who, in addition to their role within the framework of the
Global Coordinator, would maintain supervisory powers over domes-
tic markets and continue to perform review functions.
1. The Need for a Global Coordinator
The Global Coordinator would be the institutional mechanism that
is needed in any international economic organization. 4 Integration
theory identifies the existence of a common institution as a vital varia-
ble for facilitating economic integration.s Such an institution is
charged with three basic powers: first, decision-making powers re-
quired for developing the unified standards and making changes and
adaptations to future occurrences; second, monitoring powers re-
quired for ensuring the implementation of the standards; third, dis-
pute-resolution powers to resolve disagreements and to ensure a
unified interpretation. s6
The need for an institutional mechanism is highlighted by the expe-
rience with the EU harmonization plan and the General Agreement
on Trade and Tarriffs (GATI). Several commentators see the lack of
an institutional mechanism dedicated to monitoring the implementa-
tion of the EU harmonization plan as one of the plan's greatest weak-
nesses, resulting in inconsistent interpretation and implementation of
the standards.' The creation of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 1994 was a direct response to the 1947 GATT's lack of an
institutional framework and strong dispute-resolution mechanism.
These deficiencies led to GATI"s weak application in national law,
lators from more than 100 countries, including the regulatory agencies of all the major
financial centers. The IOSCO serves as the principal forum for the study and discus-
sion of international securities regulation. See, e.g., Paul Guy, Regulatory Harmoniza-
tion to Achieve Effective Interntational Competition, in Regulating International
Financial Markets: Issues and Policies 291 (Franklin R. Edward & Hugh T. Patrick
eds., 1992) (providing a general overview of IOSCO). However, as discussed below.
the IOSCO's limited powers, structure, and weak decision-making mechanism make
it, in its current form, unsuitable to serve as the Global Coordinator.
84. John P. Fitzpatrick, The Future of the North American Free Trade Agreement:
A Comparative Analysis of tire Role of Regional Economic Institutions and the Har-
monization of Law in North America and Western Europe, 19 Hous. J. Int'l L 1, 6
(1996) (expressing the need for an organization with the power to develop and har-
monize legal regimes and enforce compliance with regional law).
85. Winriied Lang, Institutional Development and Linkages - A Response, in
Creating a European Economic Space: Legal Aspects of EC-EFTA Relations 105,
105 (Mary Robinson & Jantien Findlater eds., 1989). Since the harmonization of dis-
closure rules would result in a high degree of integration of securities markets, it is
useful to analyze current models of economic integration.
86. Fitzpatrick, supra note 84, at 23 (identifying the essential powers of the institu-
tional mechanism).
87. The EU does have separate decision-making and judicial institutions. How-
ever, there is no institution which is designated to monitor the implementation and
enforcement of the EU harmonization plan. For a general discussion of the institu-
tional structure of the EU, see Dominick Lasok & John W. Bridge, Law and Institu-
tions of the European Communities (5th ed. 1991).
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and controversy over its interpretation, making it a constant improvi-
sation.88 To prevent these problems, the Global Coordinator would
be structured to ensure the implementation, unified interpretation,
and viability of the harmonized rules.
2. Decision-Making Mechanism
The Global Coordinator would be responsible for promulgating the
unified rules, making amendments to those rules, and developing fu-
ture standards. Without a decision-making mechanism to facilitate
ongoing revisions to adjust for changing circumstances, the harmo-
nized standards would become outdated.8 9
The voting mechanisms of several international organizations serve
as potential models for the Global Coordinator's decision-making
mechanism. The IOSCO's decision-making mechanism is based upon
consensus. The President's Committee adopts only unanimous deci-
sions which are not binding upon member states.90 In our context, a
consensus voting mechanism could serve the purpose of creating the
initial rules. A consensus requirement, however, which effectively
gives veto power to each member, could not be used for ongoing oper-
ations. It would be enough for one member state to resist a certain
change and paralyze the operations of the Global Coordinator and
hinder the operations of all securities markets. Thus, the IOSCO con-
sensus model would not be recommended for the Global Coordinator.
Another potential model is the voting mechanism of the WTO.
Pursuant to the WTO agreement, when a consensus cannot be
reached in the Ministerial Conference or the General Conference, a
bypass rule applies, and a decision is then reached by vote.91 The dis-
advantage of the WTO arrangement is that each nation receives one
vote, notwithstanding the size of its economy. 92 In our context, it is
not logical to provide nations that have small capital markets with the
same voting powers as nations with large markets.
A possible solution is to adopt a voting mechanism similar to that of
the United Nations Security Council. In the Security Council, every
decision on substantive matters requires the votes of nine of the fif-
88. Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for
World Trade?, 16 Mich. J. Int'l L. 349, 354 (1995) (describing the effect of GATT's
lack of an institutional framework).
89. Fitzpatrick, supra note 84, at 61-62 (exploring the role of a decision-making
institution). In fact, "[n]o regional group without the type of centralized decision-
making structure of the EU has yet been successful in fully integrating separate sover-
eign state economic systems." Frederick M. Abbott, Interpretation Without Institu-
tions: The NAFTA Mutation of the EC Model and the Future of the GATT Regime, 40
Am. J. Comp. L. 917, 945 (1992).
90. Guy, supra note 83, at 296-97 (describing the structure of IOSCO).
91. Dillon, supra note 88, at 365-66 (describing the decision-making mechanism of
the WTO).
92. Id. at 365.
1802 [Vol. 66
SECURITIES DISCLOSURE RULES
teen members, including the concurring votes of all five permanent
members. 93 Likewise, nations with large capital markets such as the
United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, and France, could
be granted a veto power similar to that of the permanent members of
the Security Council. However, giving veto powers only to a limited
number of nations is likely to raise strong resistance from other na-
tions not given such powers. In addition, the veto mechanism does
not differentiate among the levels of power of the "permanent"
members.
A better solution is to develop a mechanism similar to the EU's
qualified majority vote. Until 1987, a unanimous vote of the Council
was required to issue or amend directives.94 This effectively gave veto
power to each member state, and served as a major impediment to the
development of harmonization in Europe.9" In 1987, an amendment
to Article 100 of the Treaty of Rome replaced the unanimity require-
ment with the requirement for a qualified majority of 54 of the 76
weighted votes of the Council.96 Pursuant to the qualified majority
procedure, each nation is assigned votes in proportion to the size of its
market.97 A similar procedure could be used for the voting mecha-
nism of the Global Coordinator. Each nation would ieceive voting
rights in proportion to the capitalization of its securities market. 91
This would enable the nations most affected by the decisions of the
Global Coordinator to have a stronger voice than the nations with
limited capital markets which would be less affected. To prevent a
situation in which small nations have no say in the Global Coordina-
tor, the qualified majority would be designed to eliminate the possibil-
ity of two or three large nations being able to pass a decision over the
objections of all other nations.99 The rules promulgated by the Global
Coordinator would be binding on member states only in that they
would be required to enact them through internal legislation. Each
93. This gives a veto power to the five permanent members of the Security Coun-
cil. Department of Public Information United Nations, Basic Facts About the United
Nations 11 (1992).
94. This unanimity was required pursuant to Article 100 of the Treaty of Rome.
See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community and Connected Docu-
ments, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
95. Louis F. Del Duca, Teachings of the European Coinunity E rperience for De-
veloping Regional Organizations, 11 Dick. J. Int'l L 485, 500 (1993) (discussing the
effects of the unanimity requirement of Article 100 of the Treaty of Rome).
96. Id. at 502-04 (describing the "Qualified Majority Approximation"). A unani-
mous vote is still required for certain issues involving the movement of persons and
employee rights.
97. Id. at 503.
98. The determination of market capitalization would have to take into account
corporations that trade in more than one market.
99. A similar mechanism was adopted in the EU; it enables six of the seven
smaller nations in the EU to block a proposal by the larger nations. Del Duca, supra
note 95, at 503.
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state, however, would be allowed to choose the form and method of
implementation into national law.
3. Monitoring and Dispute-Resolution Mechanisms
It is not enough to create a "formal" unified standard. The Global
Coordinator must include an institution with the authority to monitor
the implementation of the rules into the national law of each member
state. This institution would guarantee that all of the obligations of
the member states are fulfilled, that the harmonized rules are imple-
mented across markets, and that the review process in each market is
similar. In the event that a member state was found to be in violation
of its obligations, the monitoring institution would send a notice to the
domestic authority. If the infringement continued, the monitoring in-
stitution would be authorized to suspend the recognition in documents
reviewed by the domestic authority until the violation was cured. °°
Another role of the monitoring institution would be to identify areas
in which the unified standards were not optimal, and to recommend
adjustments appropriate to the changing circumstances of the world's
securities markets. The monitoring institution would issue periodic
reports on the status of the adoption of the rules, empirical studies on
their effectiveness, and recommendations for improvement. This pro-
cess would ensure that the standards remain efficient and do not be-
come outdated.
To avoid political conflicts and to ensure the integrity of the moni-
toring institution, it should be composed of professionals with no di-
rect affiliation to the member states.10 1 An example of such an
institution is the Commission of-the EU. The Commission is a supra-
national body required to act in the general interest of the EU."'2 It
supervises the actions of member states to ensure their compliance
with EU law and investigates any breach or infringement. 10 3 The
members of the EU Commission are independent of the member
states' governments. 1°4 The monitoring institution of the Global Co-
ordinator could be structured in a similar way to the Commission of
the EU.
In addition, a dispute-resolution institution should be established.
Dispute-resolution institutions are part of most international agree-
ments.' 05 The Global Coordinator's dispute-resolution institution
100. Such quasi-judicial decisions would be subject to appeal before the dispute-
resolution mechanism.
101. The independence of the monitoring institution's member would negate the
need for an internal voting mechanism based on nationality.
102. See Lasok & Bridge, supra note 87, at 214-15.
103. Del Duca, supra note 95, at 494-95 (exploring the institutional framework of
the EU).
104. Lasok & Bridge, supra note 87, at 214-15.
105. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 84, at 78, 83 (describing the judicial institu-
tions of EFTA-EEA and NAFTA); Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World
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would hear the complaints of member states over issues such as the
implementation of the rules in other member states or unsatisfactory
review processes by other nations' competent authorities. Another
important function of the dispute-resolution mechanism would be to
ensure a uniform interpretation of the standards. Even if the rules are
"formally" harmonized, their enforcement and interpretation might
differ among nations.'06 The combination of the monitoring and dis-
pute-resolution institutions would minimize this risk.
Finally, it is important to note that neither the monitoring institu-
tion nor the dispute-resolution mechanism would replace domestic au-
thorities in monitoring the local markets. Domestic authorities would
continue to review disclosure documents,10 7 enforce national laws
(which would include the new harmonized rules) and maintain inves-
tor protection. In this respect, each member state's materiality stan-
dard would continue to apply, 08 and both domestic authorities and
investors, to the extent permitted by domestic law, would be able to
bring enforcement action against issuers that failed to meet their dis-
closure obligations.'09
II. THE CONTENT OF THE GLOBAL PROSPECTUS
This part explores the proposed content of the Global Prospec-
tus." 0 The goal is not to provide a complete code of disclosure rules;
this code would be developed within the framework of the Global Co-
Trade Organization Disputes to Nongovenunent Parties, 17 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L 295,
321-26 (1996) (comparing the dispute-resolution mechanisms of the WVTO and the
EU).
106. In connection with the IAS, the SEC has already made its endorsement of the
rules conditional on the creation of a mechanism which would guarantee rigorous
interpretation. See SEC Statement Regarding International Accounting Standards,
SEC News Digest 96-67.
107. See supra part II.C.2.
108. In the United States, the concept of materiality is reflected in Section 1l's
liability for prospectuses that contain an untrue statement of material fact or omit a
material fact required to be stated therein or is necessary to make the statement
therein not misleading. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k (West 1997). A fact is considered mate-
rial if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it
important in making an investment decision. See TSC Indust., Inc. v. Northway, Inc,
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
109. In the United States, investors have a private right of action against issuers
and certain other parties that fail to meet their disclosure obligations. An analysis of
the method used to enforce securities laws in different nations and the problems re-
lated to enforcement against foreign companies is beyond the scope of this article.
For a discussion of enforcement in the Internet era, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave
New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern Securities Regulation, 52 Bus.
Law. 1195 (1997).
110. This proposal sets forth the author's views on how multinational negotiations
on harmonized disclosure rules might conclude. In the real world, the development
and implementation of these standards would face many obstacles. For an overview
of some of the problems with harmonization, see infra part IV.
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ordinator.111 Rather, this part discusses the philosophy of the harmo-
nized disclosure standards and presents a set of disclosure rules that
cover the description of the issuer.112
This proposal is based on a comparative analysis of disclosure re-
quirements of the Major Markets. 3 The comparison also demon-
strates that the gaps between the disclosure rules of the Major
Markets are not huge, so that distillation of these rules is feasible.
The format of the presentation is based upon Regulation S-K under
the Securities Act." 4 Regulation S-K is the most comprehensive set
of disclosure rules of all Major Markets," 5 and therefore serves as a
good basis for comparison." 6
The discussion in this part is limited to non-accounting disclosure.
Financial statements which would be part of the disclosure document,
would be prepared in accordance with the new harmonized IAS." 7
The discussion also does not cover periodic reporting requirements.
In general, periodic reporting would include annual reports, whose
content would be similar to that of the Global Prospectus, and semi-
annual reports including unaudited financial statements." 8
111. The IOSCO is expected to vote in fall 1998 on a proposed draft of interna-
tional disclosure rules. Those rules, however, are to be used only for cross-border
offerings. See IOSCO Proposal, supra note 5.
112. The proposed rules do not cover offerings by small businesses, offerings which
do not involve listing on an exchange, or offerings by companies in specialized indus-
tries (such as banking, mining, etc.). See discussion supra part II.B.
113. The comparison includes mainly the disclosure requirements of the United
States, Japan, and the United Kingdom (LSE); United Kingdom rules are similar to
those of the EU Listing Particular. In addition, references are made to the disclosure
regimes of Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland. The analysis is based on the regula-
tion of the Major Markets and on information included in the Comparative Analysis
of Disclosure Regimes prepared by Working Party No.1 of the Technical Committee
of the IOSCO. See International Organization of Securities Commissions, Compara-
tive Analysis of Disclosure Regimes (1991) (available through the IOSCO's web site at
<http://www.iosco.org>) [hereinafter CADRE].
114. 17 C.F.R. § 229 (1997) [hereinafter Regulation S-K].
115. See, e.g., Shahrokh M. Saudagaran & Gary C. Biddle, Financial Disclosure
Levels and Foreign Stock Exchange Listing Decisions, 4 J. Int'l Fin. Mgmt. & Acct.
106, 124-25 (1992) (presenting a survey of 142 market participants who ranked the
U.S. reporting requirements as the most stringent among all Major Markets).
116. Another reason for using Regulation S-K as a basis for comparison is that the
American reader is already familiar with the structure of Regulation S-K.
117. For a discussion of the IAS, see IASC-U.S. Comparison Project, supra note 51.
118. Currently, the United States is the only major market which requires issuers to
furnish quarterly reports. See Cox, supra note 46, at 187. Furthermore, several com-
mentators suggest that the requirement to disclose financial information on a quar-
terly basis increases share volatility, focuses management on short term profits rather
than long term investments, and puts U.S. companies at a competitive disadvantage to
non-U.S. companies, which are not subject to mandatory quarterly reporting. See,
e.g., Bruce Alan Mann, Reexamining the Merits of Mandatory Quarterly Reporting,
Insights, Apr. 1992, at 3-4.
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A. Disclosure Philosophy
The regulators of all Major Markets share three fundamental goals:
protecting investors from fraud, promoting the efficiency of the mar-
kets, and establishing and maintaining fair and honest markets. 19
Most nations use full disclosure of all information which is material to
investors' investment decisions as a means of achieving these goals."'
There are, however, differences in the methods employed by various
nations to achieve full disclosure. The specificity of disclosure re-
quirements varies among nations. Some nations require specific dis-
closure requirements which include a list of line items and specific
instructions for their fulfillment.' 2 ' Other nations give greater weight
to custom and have only a general obligation to disclose all material
information.122
The disclosure philosophy of the Global Prospectus would be based
on two special requirements: First, detailed line item requirements,
which would include instructions for their fulfillment; second, a gen-
eral requirement to disclose any information that may be necessary to
make the information contained in the prospectus not misleading
under the circumstances which it is made. 2 Using specific line items
is needed to overcome the gaps in customary practices among nations.
Specific line items ensure similarity among documents drafted in dif-
ferent nations and will therefore result in better comparability. Fur-
thermore, it is easier to monitor compliance with specific
requirements than with general custom.
B. The Business
The description of the issuer's business is the most important infor-
mation for investors' investment decisions. Consequently, a descrip-
tion of the business is required in all Major Markets. 24 In the Global
Prospectus, the description of the business and its development would
be divided into three parts. The first would be a narrative description
of the issuer's business and property. The second part would contain
financial statements covering the three most recent fiscal years, to be
prepared in accordance with the new harmonized IASY1- The third
119. International Organization of Securities Commissions, International Equity
Offers 7 (1989) (available through the IOSCO's web site at <httpJ/www.iosco.org>).
120. Id at 8. Some countries, such as Canada, use a certain degree of merit review
in addition to disclosure to achieve the goal of protecting investors.
121. See, e.g., Regulation S-K, supra note 114 (listing U.S. reporting requirements).
122. CADRE, supra note 113, at 3-4 (exploring differences in disclosure systems
among the Major Markets).
123. Similar disclosure is required in the United States, pursuant to 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.421 (1997).
124. CADRE, supra note 113, at 9.
125. For a description of the new LAS, see IASC-U.S. Comparison Project, supra
note 51. Those standards will not be discussed in this paper.
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part would contain management's discussion and analysis of the com-
pany's financial condition and results of operations.
1. Development of the Business
Information required under this caption includes a description of
the general development of the business as well as specific line items
concerning the issuer's organizational form, material acquisitions, dis-
positions, and major investments. The U.S. requirements cover the
general development of the issuer's business and its subsidiaries dur-
ing the preceding five years.126 Information from earlier periods is
required if it is material for the understanding of the general develop-
ment of the business. 127 Japan requires information about the issuer's
history from the date of incorporation, including any mergers or
changes of business purpose." In addition, any changes in the busi-
ness product items in the most recent financial year must be re-
ported.'29 In the United Kingdom, 3 ' general information is required
only with respect to trends in the group's-the issuer and its subsidiar-
ies-business since the end of the financial year to which the last pub-
lished annual accounts relate.' 3' Issuers also are required to describe
the group's prospects for at least the current financial year.1
32
The Global Prospectus would require the disclosure of the informa-
tion on the history and development of the issuer's business for the
most recent three years. This three-year period correlates to the pe-
riod covered by the financial statements. 33 Information from prior
periods would be required if it is material to an understanding of the
general development of the issuer's business. A general disclosure
concerning the entire life of the company, as required in Japan, would
be too long and partially irrelevant. The discussion of the develop-
ment of the business would include the following line items:
126. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(a) (1997).
127. Id.
128. Securities Registration Statement - Instruction for Completion § 19(2), trans-
lation of Form 7 prepared by Nomura Securities (on file with author) [hereinafter
Form 7]. Form 7 is used by foreign corporations which offer their securities publicly
in Japan. The content of Form 7 is similar to that of Form 2, which is used by domes-
tic companies except for the sections that refer to financial statements.
129. Id. § 20(1)(c).
130. In the United Kingdom, the disclosure requirements are set out in chapter 6 of
the London Stock Exchange Listing Rules (1997) [hereinafter Yellow Book].
131. Id. § 6.G.l(a). Trend information is required in particular with respect to (a)
the most significant trends in production, sales, stocks, and the state of the order
book, and (b) recent trends in costs of selling prices. Id.
132. Id. § 6.G.1(b). This information requirement is unique to the United Kingdom
and is not required in accordance with the equivalent clause of the EU Listing
Particular.
133. Whenever information on interim periods following the most recent complete
fiscal years would be required in the financial statements, narrative disclosure for the
same period would be provided in the Global Prospectus.
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a. Year and Form of Organization - The year in which the issuer
was organized and the form of organization must be disclosed in the
United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom."M Similar informa-
tion including information on the internal corporate governance sys-
tem of the issuer would be required in the Global Prospectus.1 3
b. The Nature and Results of Bankruptcy and Similar Proceedings
- The United States requires the disclosure of the nature and results
of any bankruptcy, receivership, or similar proceedings with respect to
the issuer or any significant subsidiary.'36 The Japanese requirement
in this area is identical.' 37 In the United Kingdom, there is no specific
requirement to disclose this particular information. This type of infor-
mation, however, is disclosed in accordance with the requirement to
disclose exceptional factors which have had a significant effect on the
group's financial position.138  Applying the disclosure philosophy,
which calls for specific requirements, the Global Prospectus would
mandate disclosure similar to that required in the United States and
Japan.
c. Material Reclassification, Merger or Consolidation - In the
United States, issuers are required to disclose the nature and results of
a material reclassification, merger, or consolidation of the issuer or
any of its significant subsidiaries. 139 Japan requires disclosure of any
merger since the date of incorporation of the issuer. 4 In the United
Kingdom, this topic is covered by two rules. First, there is a general
requirement to disclose any exceptional factors which have influenced
the group's activities.' 4 ' Second, there is a requirement to state the
aggregate consideration for shares issued in connection with any
merger, division of the company, takeover or acquisition of an under-
taking's assets and liabilities. 4 2
134. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(a)(1) (1997); Form 7, supra note 128, §§ 14(2), 19(2) (Ja-
pan); Yellow Book, supra note 130, §§ 6.C.3, 6.C.4 (United Kingdom).
135. Information on the internal corporate governance system should focus on
shareholder rights, the board of directors and the allocation of power between the
shareholders and the board of directors. Information concerning relevant legislation
in the country where the issuer is incorporated would be provided in another section
of the Global Prospectus. See infra text accompanying note 241.
136. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(a)(1) (1997). A subsidiary is defined as significant if the
issuer's investment in or advances to the subsidiary exceeds 10% of the issuer's total
consolidated assets, or if the issuer's equity in the subsidiary's income from continuing
operations exceeds 10% of the issuer's consolidated income from continuing opera-
tions. 17 C.F.R §§ 210.1-02(w)(1), (3) (1997).
137. CADRE, supra note 113, at 24.
138. Yellow Book, supra note 130, § 6.D.9.
139. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(a)(1) (1997).
140. Form 7, supra note 128, § 19(2). In addition, if the company has merged or
entered into a contract for merger during the period from the beginning of the busi-
ness year to the filing date, the issuer is required to explain the purpose and terms of
the merger. Id. § 20(2)(a).
141. Yellow Book, supra note 130, § 6.D.5.
142. Id. § 6.C.22.
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The Global Prospectus would require a general description of any
merger or consolidation. In addition, the terms of the transaction
would be described pursuant to the requirement to describe any mate-
rial contract entered into outside of the ordinary course of business
during the three most recent fiscal years. 14 3
d. Acquisition or Disposition of Material Assets - The United
States requires a description of the acquisition or disposition of any
material amount of assets other than in the ordinary course of busi-
ness."' In Japan, the disclosure of the acquisition or disposition of
material assets is divided into three categories. Investments in securi-
ties of other companies ("main investments") are disclosed in sched-
ules to the financial reports. 45  Internal capital investments
("principal investments") in plants, factories, and research and devel-
opment are disclosed annually.146 Material dispositions are disclosed
pursuant to a requirement for a summary of changes to the business,
including information regarding the type, content, and amount of
profits or losses on assets sold. 147 The United Kingdom requires a
description, with figures, of the main investments made, including in-
terests such as shares and debt, in other undertakings over the last
three financial years and during the current financial year.14 8 Infor-
mation in the report must include principal investments, including
plants, factories and research and development; the geographical dis-
tribution of the investments, home and abroad; and the method of
internal and external financing. 149
The Global Prospectus would require the disclosure of three topics
under this caption. First, investments in securities of other companies
including the method of financing. Second, material capital invest-
ments in plants and factories including geographical distribution and
method of financing. Third, any significant acquisition or disposition
of material assets other than in the ordinary course of business. Infor-
mation concerning investments in research and development is to be
disclosed under a different caption. 5
143. See infra text accompanying notes 191-93.
144. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(a)(1) (1997). In addition to the narrative disclosure, the
issuer has to submit financial statements, including Pro Forma reports of significant
acquisitions. 17 C.F.R § 210.3-05 (1997).
145. CADRE, supra note 113, at 22.
146. Id. at 23.
147. Id. at 22.
148. Yellow Book, supra note 130, § 6.D.11.
149. Id. § 6.D.12. Information concerning principal investments must cover future
investments on which the issuer's directors have already made firm commitments. Id.
§ 6.D.3.
150. Research and development investments are to be described as part of the de-
scription of the issuer's business. See infra text accompanying notes 161-66.
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2. Description of the Business
Under this caption issuers would be required to provide a general
description of the business followed by a list of line items. The United
States requires a description of the business to be completed by the
issuer and its subsidiaries, focusing upon the issuer's dominant indus-
try segment or each reportable segment.15' Japan requires a descrip-
tion of the nature of the business, and any significant changes in the
business purpose or product items, from the beginning of the financial
year to the filing date of the statement.5 2 In the United Kingdom, the
listing rules require a description of the issuer's principal objects' 53
and the group's principal activities.'"
The Global Prospectus would require a brief description of the na-
ture of the business and the products or services rendered and any
material change in the three most recent fiscal years. This would pro-
vide investors with a general background on the company's business
before specific issues are addressed. In addition, the following line
items would be required:
a. Principal Products and Services - In the United States, issuers
are required to disclose their principal products and services in each
industry segment and principal market. In addition, issuers must state
the amount, or percentage, of total revenues which are contributed by
any class of products or services accounting for 10% or more of con-
solidated revenues in the three preceding fiscal years. 55 Japanese
regulations call for disclosure of the amount, or percentage, of reve-
nues for each segment. Segments are defined as those product lines
accounting for 10% or more of revenue, profit, or loss.' 56 In the
United Kingdom, issuers are required to disclose the group's principal
activities, including the main categories of products sold or services
performed.157 There is no requirement, though, to disclose the
amount of revenues for each segment of products.
A compromise is needed in the area of segmented information. The
U.S. requirement to disclose the amount of revenues for each line of
business has encountered strong opposition from domestic and for-
eign issuers who believe that this requirement deprives them of poten-
tial competitive advantages.'-5  Consequently, the Global Prospectus
would adopt the following strategy. Issuers would be required to pro-
vide a narrative description of each line of business accounting for
151. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c) (1997).
152. Form 7, supra note 128, § 20(1).
153. Yellow Book, supra note 130, § 6.C.5.
154. Id. § 6.D.1.
155. 17 C.FR. § 229.101(c)(i) (1997). The threshold is 15% or more of consolidated
revenues if they did not exceed $50,000,000 during any of those fiscal years. Id.
156. CADRE, supra note 113, at 10.
157. Yellow Book, supra note 130, § 6.D.1.
158. Cox, supra note 46, at 174 (describing the controversy over line of business
information).
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10% or more of consolidated revenues. Numerical information, in-
cluding the number of products sold and the revenues derived from
them, would also be required, unless this requirement is waived-on a
case by case basis-by the domestic authority. The waiver would be
provided only if the adverse effects of the disclosure significantly out-
weigh the benefits to investors. 159 Full descriptions (narrative and nu-
merical) would be provided for geographical segments. 160
b. Description of Products Being Developed - The United States
requires a description of the development of new products and of en-
try into new industry segments in certain circumstances. The descrip-
tion is required only if the issuer has already made public information
about the new product or segment and its development would require
the investment of a material amount of assets, or if the new develop-
ment is otherwise material. 161 Moreover, estimated expenditures on
research and development of new products must be disclosed for a
three-year period, if material. 62 In Japan, the status of research and
development activities during the last two business years must be dis-
closed.1 63 In addition, information on principal investments, including
research and development, has to be disclosed.164 United Kingdom
listing rules require the disclosure of information describing research
and development over the three most recent financial years.16 5 In ad-
dition, such information is provided in the description of principal
investments.166
The Global Prospectus would mandate the disclosure of issuers' re-
search and development policy, and a description-including
figures-of material research and development investments over the
preceding three years. Issuers would be allowed to withhold informa-
tion about specific projects that had not yet been made public.
c. Sources and Availability of Raw Materials - Information con-
cerning the sources and availability of raw materials must be disclosed
in the United States.167 Japan requires the disclosure of the volume
and price of principal raw materials purchased. 168 Unlike the United
States and Japan, the United Kingdom listing rules do not require the
disclosure of information concerning raw materials. However, such
159. For a similar approach, see id. at 189-90 (suggesting the adoption of a safe
harbor that would allow the company to maintain confidential line of business
information).
160. See infra text accompanying note 209.
161. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(ii) (1997).
162. Id. § 229.101(c)(xi).
163. Form 7, supra note 128, § 20 (3).
164. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
165. Yellow Book, supra note 130, § 6.D.7.
166. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
167. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(iii) (1997).
168. Form 7, supra note 128, § 21(3)(c).
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information is disclosed in the United Kingdom pursuant to custom. 169
The Global Prospectus would require a description of sources, the
availability of raw materials, and the price trends of the raw materials
in the three most recent fiscal years.
d. Information Regarding Patents and Licenses - In the United
States, information is required on the existence, duration, and effect
of all patents, trademarks, licenses, franchises, and concessions. 7 ' In
Japan, information about patents and licenses is not a line item, but is
disclosed in offering documents pursuant to custom. 71 United King-
dom rules mandate the disclosure of information concerning the ex-
tent to which the group is dependent on patents, licenses or new
manufacturing processes, where such factors are of fundamental im-
portance to the group's business or profitability."n Today, in the tech-
nology era, the importance of intellectual property to an issuer's
business cannot be overstated. 173 Consequently, the Global Prospec-
tus would include a line item similar to that required in the United
Kingdom and the United States.
e. Seasonality - Material seasonal variations and their effect on
the industry segment are required to be disclosed in the United
States.174 No specific requirement regarding seasonality is mandated
in Japan. 75 In the United Kingdom, however, seasonal trends are dis-
closed pursuant to the requirement to disclose information on trends
in the group's business since the previous year. This requirement cov-
ers trends in production, sales, stocks, costs, and selling prices. 176 An
approach similar to that of the United Kingdom would be used in the
Global Prospectus. Requirements to disclose all recent trends, rather
than only those derived from seasonality-as required in the United
States-would give a better understanding of the issuer's business.
f. Practices Related to Working Capital - The United States and
Canada are the only countries of all the Major Markets which man-
date the disclosure of practices related to working capital. 7  How-
ever, in the United States, foreign issuers are exempt from this
169. CADRE, supra note 113, at 9 (providing tabular data on the description of
business disclosure requirements in the Major Markets).
170. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(iv) (1997).
171. CADRE, supra note 113, at 9.
172. Yellow Book, supra note 130, § 6.D.6.
173. Such information is disclosed (in accordance with law or custom) in all the
Major Markets except Switzerland. CADRE, supra note 113, at 9.
174. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(v) (1997).
175. Seasonality is reflected, however, in the description of major operational indi-
ces over the most recent five years, which includes turnover and net operating profits.
See Form 7, supra note 128, § 19(1). In addition, seasonality is required to be de-
scribed in semiannual reports. CADRE, supra note 113, at 15.
176. Yellow Book, supra note 130, § 6.G.1.
177. CADRE, supra note 113, at 9. Working capital practice refers to carrying a
significant amount of inventory and whether the issuer provides customers with ex-
tended payment terms or the right to return goods. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(vi) (1997).
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requirement. 17 The Global Prospectus would not have a specific line
item for a description of practices related to working capital for two
reasons. First, the results of these practices are already reflected in
the cash flow statement. Second, because the disclosure of this item is
not required in most of the Major Markets, mandating it would re-
quire changes in the practices of many markets.
g. Dependence on Particular Customers - In the United States,
the dependence of an industry segment upon a single customer or a
few customers must be disclosed if the loss of the customer or custom-
ers could adversely affect the industry segment. 79 In Japan, the iden-
tity of material customers accounting for 10% or more of the issuer's
unconsolidated revenues must be disclosed. The United Kingdom re-
quires the disclosure of group dependence on commercial and finan-
cial contracts of fundamental importance to the group's business or
profitability. 8 ' Under the general materiality concept, 181 this require-
ment is interpreted as requiring disclosure of the dependence on im-
portant customers, even if no long-term contract exists.182
Information about the dependence on a particular customer is im-
portant for assessment of the risk involved in investing in a particular
company. Thus, such information would be disclosed in the Global
Prospectus. However, the identity of a specific customer might be a
commercial secret, the disclosure of which could put the issuer at a
competitive disadvantage. A good balance between these interests
would be created by the adoption of the United States requirement
calling for disclosure of customer identity only in specific situations. 18 3
In addition, issuers would be able to withhold information on the
identity of specific customers if the adverse effects of the disclosure
significantly outweigh the benefits to investors.
h. Backlog Orders - U.S. regulations require disclosure of the dol-
lar amount of definite orders, as of a recent date, and a comparable
date, in the preceding fiscal year, as well as an indication of the
number of orders not reasonably expected to be filled within the cur-
rent fiscal year."8 Such disclosure is not required from foreign issu-
178. 17 C.F.R. § 249.220(0 (1997).
179. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(vii) (1997). In addition, the identity of a customer ac-
counting for 10% or more of the issuer's consolidated revenues must be disclosed if
the loss of such a customer would have a material adverse effect on the issuer and its
subsidiaries. Id.
180. Yellow Book, supra note 130, § 6.D.6.
181. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, § 146 (Eng.).
182. CADRE, supra note 113, at 13 (providing the EU interpretation).
183. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. This approach bridges the gap
between the United Kingdom (and the EU) which does not require identification of
important customers, and the Japanese requirement to disclose the identity of any
customer which accounts for more than 10% of the issuer's revenues on an unconsoli-
dated basis.
184. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(viii) (1997).
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ers.185 Japanese requirements include the disclosure of the volume of
orders received, and the outstanding balance of orders that remain
unfulfilled for each product item.186 In the United Kingdom, issuers
are required to disclose trends in the group's business.l67
The Global Prospectus would include a requirement to disclose the
state of the order book as of the date of the most recent financial
statements, and a comparable date in the preceding years to which the
financial statements refer.
i. Contracts Subject to Renegotiation - In the United States, de-
tails on contracts subject to renegotiation at the election of the gov-
ernment must be disclosed." In Japan, there is no mandatory
requirement for the disclosure of information on contracts subject to
renegotiation, but such information is disclosed pursuant to custom.18 9
In the United Kingdom, the issue is covered under the general re-
quirement to disclose the extent to which the issuer's group is depen-
dent on commercial and financial contracts. 9°
The Global Prospectus would not include a separate line item cov-
ering contracts subject to renegotiation. The issue would be covered
under a broader requirement to disclose the terms of any material
contracts, and the extent to which the issuer is dependent on such con-
tracts. Similar requirements exist in the United States, Japan, and the
United Kingdom. In the United States, material contracts are re-
quired to be filed as exhibits to the registration statement. 91 Japan
requires the disclosure of the content of material contracts concluded
during the most recent business year.192 Similarly, the United King-
dom requires a summary of the content of each material contract en-
tered into by any member of the group in the two years immediately
preceding the publication of the particular listing.193 This requirement
does not extend to contracts which were entered into in the ordinary
course of business. With the authorization of the competent author-
ity, issuers would be permitted to withhold commercial secrets from
their descriptions of contracts.1 94 This authorization would be granted
only if the disclosure of the information would have a material ad-
verse effect on the issuer.
185. 17 C.F.R. § 249.220(f) (1997).
186. Form 7, supra note 128, § 21(4).
187. Yellow Book, supra note 130, § 6.G.1.
188. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(ix) (1997).
189. CADRE, supra note 113, at 9.
190. Yellow Book, supra note 130, § 6.D.6.
191. 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(10) (1997). A material contract is defined as any con-
tract not made in the ordinary course of business which is material to the issuer and is
to be carried out, in whole or in part, at or after the filing of the registration material,
or which was entered into not more than two years before such filing.
192. CADRE, supra note 113, at 16.
193. Yellow Book, supra note 130, § 6.C.20.
194. In the U.S., a similar exception applies to confidential information in material
contracts. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.406 (1997).
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j. Competitive Conditions in the Business - In the United States,
issuers are required to disclose, where material, information on the
markets in which they compete, including an estimate of the number
of competitors, the issuer's competitive position, and its principal
methods of competition. 95 Foreign issuers are required to disclose
only unusual competitive conditions in the industry.' 96 Japan requires
information showing the issuer's competitive position and ranking in
the relevant field of business. 197 In contrast, the United Kingdom's
listing requirements do not refer to the competitive conditions of the
business. However, pursuant to custom, information is disclosed on
the markets in which the issuer competes. 19
The Global Prospectus would mandate disclosure of information on
the principal markets in which the issuer competes and the issuer's
competitive position. This information would enable investors to bet-
ter compare the issuer's performance with that of other companies in
the field.
k. Effects of Government Regulation - In the United States, the
discussion of the effects of government regulation is limited to envi-
ronmental matters. 9 9 In Japan and the United Kingdom, the subject
of government regulation is customarily discussed in annual
reports.2 0
There is no reason to limit the discussion of government regulation
to environmental issues. Consequently, the Global Prospectus would
include a discussion of the effects of government regulation that mate-
rially affects the issuer and the industries in which it operates.
1. Persons Employed - The United States requires the disclosure
of the number of persons employed by the issuer."0' In Japan, issuers
are required to disclose the number of employees and employment
trends of temporary and permanent employees.2" The United King-
dom requires disclosure of the average number of employees and
changes over the three preceding financial years-if material-with, if
possible, a breakdown of persons employed according to their main
categories of activities."0 3
The number of employees and trends of employment are one way
to assess an issuer's efficiency. This information also tends to reflect
195. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(x) (1997).
196. 17 C.F.R. § 249.220(f) (1997). See, in particular, Item 1(a)(5) of Form 20-F.
197. Form 7, supra note 128, § 21(1).
198. CADRE, supra note 113, at 9.
199. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(xii) (1997).
200. CADRE, supra note 113, at 14.
201. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(xiii) (1997). It is customary, however, to include man-
agement's assessment of its relationship with employees and to state whether the em-
ployees are subject to collective bargaining agreements. See CADRE, supra note 113,
at 11.
202. Form 7, supra note 128, § 19(11).
203. Yellow Book, supra note 130, § 6.D.10.
[Vol. 661816
SECURITIES DISCLOSURE RULES
the volatility of the issuer's business and its growth. Consequently,
the Global Prospectus would adopt the United Kingdom require-
ments, which refer to the same three year period that applies for most
other requirements. In addition, information concerning the relation-
ship between management and employees, and material labor dis-
putes would be provided.
3. Information about Industry Segments, Foreign Activities
and Subsidiaries
This section covers the breakdown of the issuer's activities into in-
dustry segments, geographic markets, and a description of the issuer's
subsidiaries.
a. Segmented Information and Foreign Activities - Segmented in-
formation about revenues, operating profits or losses, and foreign ac-
tivities, is required in most of the Major Markets.2" In the United
States, the disclosure requirements cover the three most recent fiscal
years, and include the amount of revenues, operating profits or losses,
and identifiable assets attributable to each of the issuer's segments20
and geographic areas.2' Japanese requirements concerning seg-
mented information include revenues, and operational profits and
losses for each industry segment and foreign market.2° The United
Kingdom requires a breakdown of net turnover during the three pre-
ceding financial years by category of activity and by geographic mar-
ket insofar as such categories and markets differ substantially from
one another. 2 8
In the Global Prospectus, information about industry segments-
including foreign activities-would include a narrative describing the
company's operations in different markets and a breakdown of reve-
nues and operating profits and losses for each market. The identifica-
tion of assets attributed to each segment-as required in the United
States-would be part of the description of property.2°
b. Subsidiaries - Details about subsidiaries are required in all Ma-
jor Markets, except for Australia and the United States..2 10 The
United States requires only the disclosure of the name and the juris-
204. CADRE, supra note 113, at 17 (providing tabular information on industry seg-
ment disclosure); Ud at 24 (presenting information on foreign and domestic operations
and export sales).
205. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(b) (1997). Alternatively, the information can be provided
in the financial statements. Id.
206. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(d). Alternatively, the information can be provided in the
financial statements. Id
207. Form 7, supra note 128, § 21(5).
208. Yellow Book, supra note 130, § 6.D.3.
209. See infra text accompanying notes 216-19.
210. CADRE, supra note 113, at 17.
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diction of incorporation of significant subsidiaries.21' Japanese re-
quirements concerning subsidiaries are much broader. For each
subsidiary, the issuer must disclose its name and address, its capital,
the type of business, the issuer's holding of voting rights, and the basis
of the issuer's relationship with the subsidiary.212 In the United King-
dom, for each subsidiary which meets certain requirements,2"' a very
detailed description is required. This description includes the field of
activity, capital, proportion of capital held by the issuer, and financial
information.214
In the Global Prospectus, issuers would be required to provide a
chart of the corporate structure. The chart would include the issuer's
parent company, if any, and any significant subsidiaries. A significant
subsidiary would be defined as one which accounts for 10% or more
of the issuer's consolidated assets or net profits or losses. For each
significant subsidiary, the following information would be required:
name and address, the issued capital and the issuer's holdings, and the
fields of activity. Additional information would be presented in the
financial statements.21 5
4. Description of Property
The United States requires issuers to state briefly the location and
general character of the principal plants, and other materially impor-
tant physical properties owned or leased by the issuer and its subsidi-
aries.216 In addition, issuers are required to identify the industry
211. 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(21) (1997). Additional information is required, how-
ever, in the financial statements for non-consolidated subsidiaries. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 210.3-09.
212. Form 7, supra note 128, § 19(9).
213. These requirements include if the book value of the issuer's participating inter-
est represents at least 10% of the issuer's capital and reserves or if the interest
amounts to at least 10% of the consolidated net profit or loss. Yellow Book, supra
note 130, § 6.E.11(b).
214. The United Kingdom further requires issuers to disclose the value at which the
issuer shows the subsidiary in its accounts, any amount still to be paid on shares held,
the amount of dividends received in the course of the preceding financial year with
respect to shares held, and the amount of debt owed to and by the issuer with regard
to the subsidiary. Id. § 6.E.11(a). Certain items may be omitted for subsidiaries which
do not publish annual accounts, id. § 6.E.11(c), or which are consolidated into the
issuer's financial statement, id. § 6.E.11(d),
215. Subsidiaries in which the issuer's holdings exceed 50% would be consolidated
into the financial statements. The equity method of accounting would be used for
investments in associate companies in which the investments provide the issuer with
the ability to exercise significant influence over the operations and financial policies
of the investee company. Under the equity method, the issuer's share of profits and
losses of associate companies is included in the consolidated income statements. See
IASC-U.S. Comparison Project, supra note 51, at 367-92 (analyzing the new interna-
tional standards concerning accounting for investment in subsidiaries and in associate
companies).
216. 17 C.F.R. § 229.102 (1997). In determining whether properties should be de-
scribed. both quantitative and qualitative factors should be taken into account. Id.
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segments which use the properties described, and any major encum-
brances.2 17 Japan requires disclosure of the general character of the
properties, their location, products manufactured there, number of
employees in each facility, encumbrances on the properties, and the
amount of the issuer's invested capital in the properties.218 The
United Kingdom requires a description of the location, size, and ten-
ure of the group's principal establishments and summary information
about land or buildings owned or leased. 1 9
The Global Prospectus would require a description of any fixed as-
sets which account for 10% or more of the issuer's consolidated assets
or revenues, or are otherwise material for the issuer's operation. The
description would include the location, general character and use of
the assets, as well as identification of the industry segment in which
the asset is used, production information and major encumbrances.
C. Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
of Operations
This section focuses on information which investors cannot readily
obtain from the financial statements. This includes management's ex-
planation of any unusual factors that have affected historical perform-
ance as described in the prospectus, and management's projection of
future performance. In the United States, management's discussion of
financial condition and results of operations is provided in specific line
items,' while in Japan and the United Kingdom, such information, if
provided, is part of the general description of the firm.
The Global Prospectus would follow the American approach. In-
vestors should be provided wvith information that enables them to fully
comprehend the numerical data provided in the financial statements.
The discussion would cover the three year period of the financial
statements and would include, in addition to the information required
in the United States, management's assessment of the issuer's future
performance. Management's discussion should not be limited to the
specific line items provided below. The discussion should include any
information required for a true understanding of the issuer's financial
position.
a. Unusual Factors Affecting Income from Operations - Discus-
sion of this item is required to clarify how certain matters, not evident
on historical financial reports, affect future operating results. In the
United States, issuers are required to describe any unusual or infre-
quent events or transactions, or any significant economic changes, that
217. Id.
218. Form 7, supra note 128, § 22.
219. Yellow Book, supra note 130, § 6.D.4. A principal establishment is defined as
any establishment which accounts for more than 10% of net turnover or production.
IL
220. 17 C.F.R. § 229303 (1997).
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materially affected the amount of reported income from operations,
and to indicate the extent to which income was so affected.2 2 1 Japan
requires disclosure of unusual factors affecting income from opera-
tions during the two preceding fiscal years.222 In the United Kingdom,
an indication must be given if exceptional factors influenced the
group's activities, products, or the net turnover during the three pre-
ceding financial years.223
The Global Prospectus would require the discussion of any event or
condition that materially affects income from operations. In addition,
an explanation for any material change in income or profit during the
most recent three years should be provided.
b. Liquidity and Capital Resources - U.S. rules require the disclo-
sure of any factor which might lead to a material increase or decrease
in the issuer's liquidity. If a material deficiency is identified, the issuer
is required to indicate the course of action that it has taken, or pro-
poses to take, to remedy the deficiency. Internal and external sources
of liquidity are also required to be discussed.224 The United Kingdom
requires a statement by the issuer that its working capital is sufficient
for the group's present requirements; if it is insufficient, and if the
issuer has securities already listed, it must explain how it will provide
the additional working capital thought to be necessary.12 5 Unlike the
United States and the United Kingdom, Japan does not require a spe-
cific discussion of liquidity, other than a statement of cash flow.226
In the Global Prospectus, to the extent that it is not reflected in the
statement of cash flow and accompanying notes, the issuer would be
required to describe its sources of liquidity and cash flow. In addition,
a description of the company's capital resources, including a descrip-
tion of the company's debts, credit facilities, off-balance sheet fi-
nances, and established funding plans would be disclosed. This
information is important to investors, as it enables them to evaluate
companies' financial strength and ability to fund their capital
expenditures.
c. Capital Expenditures - In the United States, issuers are re-
quired to describe material commitments for capital expenditures as
of the end of the latest fiscal period, and to indicate the general pur-
pose of such commitments and the anticipated source of funds needed
to fulfill such commitments. 2 7 Moreover, issuers are required to
identify any anticipated material trends in capital resources and
221. Id. § 229.303(a)(3)(i).
222. CADRE, supra note 113, at 41.
223. Yellow Book, supra note 130, § 6.D.5.
224. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1) (1997).
225. Yellow Book, supra note 130, § 6.E.16.
226. Discussion of liquidity is provided, however, in annual or periodic reports. See
CADRE, supra note 113, at 40.
227. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(2)(i) (1997).
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changes in sources of capital.'3 Japanese disclosure concerning capi-
tal expenditures covers only investment in plants, equipment,2 9 and
established financing plans." The United Kingdom requires the dis-
closure of information concerning the group's principal future invest-
ments-including new plants, factories, and research and
development-to which the issuer's directors have already made firm
commitments. 231
There is no reason to limit the discussion of capital expenditures to
investments of a certain type. Consequently, the Global Prospectus
would require discussion of all of the issuer's plans for material capital
expenditures for the following three years, unless such plans have not
yet been made public, and management reasonably believes that dis-
closure of such information would have a material adverse effect on
the issuer.
d. Business Prospects - In the United States, issuers are required
to describe all known trends and uncertainties that have had, or are
reasonably expected to have, a material impact on net sales, revenues,
or income from continuing operations. Issuers are also required to
disclose events that are reasonably expected to occur, and are likely to
cause material changes in the relationship between costs and reve-
nues.232 Although no profit forecasts are required, issuers are pro-
vided with a safe harbor for forward-looking statements.?233 In the
United Kingdom, issuers must provide information on the group's
prospects for at least the current financial year.' Where a profit
forecast or estimate appears, the principal assumptions upon which it
is based must be stated by independent accountants. -? 5 No such infor-
mation is required in Japan.
The Global Prospectus would require the disclosure of both trend
information (as required in the United States), and future forecasts
(as required in the United Kingdom). Trend information is critical for
understanding the volatility to which the issuer's operation is exposed.
Future forecasts are essential for the valuation of securities. Forecasts
of future performance need not include exact figures. Rather, they
should present management's estimate of the issuer's future profits,
the assumptions underlying these estimates, as well as any risk factors
that might affect the forecast. The information should be accompa-
nied by cautionary language stating that this information is the man-
agement's forecast and that there is no assurance that actual results
228. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(2)(ii).
229. Form 7, supra note 128, § 22(1)(a).
230. Id. § 26(2).
231. Yellow Book, supra note 130, § 6.D.13.
232. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (1997).
233. Section 27A of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 (1997).
234. Yellow Book, supra note 130, § 6.G.1(b).
235. Id § 6.G.2. In addition, the sponsoring member firm must have satisfied itself
that the forecast was made after a due inquiry by the directors. Id.
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will be similar. Information provided pursuant to this section, and
which meets the above standards, would be shielded from legal
action.236
D. Information for Foreign Investors
One of the main objects of harmonization is to enable investors to
invest in any market without incurring the costs of gathering informa-
tion privately.237 To achieve this goal, the Global Prospectus would
provide foreign investors with material information on the issuer's
home market. This information would appear in two different sections
of the Global Prospectus. General information on the issuer's home
market which is relevant to all foreign investors would be part of the
Basic Form.238 This would facilitate investors' access to foreign mar-
kets and promote investment in companies which do not offer or list
their securities in the investors' home markets. Specific information
which is relevant only to investors from the countries in which the
issuer is conducting a multinational offering would appear in the
Global Form. 39
1. Information in the Basic Form
The Basic Form would include general information which is impor-
tant to foreign investors. Because this information is generic, in order
to reduce issuers' costs, each competent authority would maintain a
central database containing the following information.240
a. Summary of the Corporate System - To save on the transaction
costs involved in each investor becoming familiar with the corporate
system of foreign markets, each prospectus would include a descrip-
tion of the corporate system in the country in which the issuer has
been organized.24' The description would focus on issues that are ma-
terial to investors, such as corporate governance and shareholder
rights.
236. For the important role of projections and the need to provide forward-looking
statements with a safe harbor, see Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Se-
curities Act Release No. 7101, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,436, at 85,779 (Oct. 13, 1994).
237. See Geiger, supra note 4, at 301-02.
238. Part of the information would also be useful for domestic investors who are
not fully familiar with the corporate and tax systems in their own market.
239. The information would be provided only in the Global Forms because it is not
practical to require every domestic company to supply this information with respect
to foreign markets in which it does not offer securities.
240. This would enable issuers to copy the information into their offering docu-
ments with no significant costs. Issuers would be required, however, to make adapta-
tions to the generic material if specific rules applied to them.
241. A similar summary is required in Japan. See Form 7, supra note 128, § 14(1).
The Japanese requirements, however, apply only to foreign companies which offer
securities in Japan.
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b. Restrictions on Foreign Ownership of Securities and Exchange
Control - This line item would include limitations on the rights of
foreign investors to hold, transfer, or vote the securities.242 The infor-
mation also would be provided with respect to any exchange control
regulations affecting the export of capital, remittance of dividends,
and any other payments to shareholders.
c. Taxation - The Basic Form would provide a brief description of
the method by which securities are taxed in the issuer's home coun-
try.2 43 In addition, issuers would be required to disclose information
on any taxes to which foreign investors are subject, including a de-
scription of any withholding tax provisions to which non-residents are
subject.
2. Additional Information in the Global Form
The Global Form would be a "wrap around" of a translation of the
Basic Form into the language of the host market. In addition, the
Global Form would include an appendix which would supply informa-
tion important to investors from the host market. Such information
would include the following:
a. Restrictions on Foreign Ownership of Securities and Exchange
Control - This section covers specific restrictions, if any, which apply
to investors from the host country.
b. Exchange Rate Translation - A table of the exchange rate for
the three preceding fiscal years, plus any subsequent interim period,
should be provided.
c. Taxation - a brief description of the withholding tax and capital
gains provisions of any tax treaty between the issuer's home market
and the host country should be provided.
d. Paying Agent - The issuer would be required to designate an
agent for payment of dividends, transfer of securities, and delivery of
information to shareholders in the host market. Details on the iden-
tity of the agent, and the procedures of payment and transfer of secur-
ities should be disclosed in the Global Form. If depository facilities
242. This information is required in most Major Markets. See CADRE supra note
113, at 38.
243. Disclosure concerning taxes, to which security holders may be subject in ac-
cordance with the issuer's home country regulations, is required or customary in all
Major Markets but Australia. See CADRE, supra note 113, at 39.
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are established, 2 " information on their procedures and the identity of
depositors would be provided. 45
e. Method and Expected Schedule for the Multinational Offering
- Multinational offerings involve a review process by at least two
authorities from the home and host countries; they also require the
coordination of distribution systems among markets. The method of
coordination and the distribution arrangements should be provided, as
well as the date until which the offer will be open and the expected
timetable for the offering.2 46
f. Material Changes - Mutual recognition would be required for a
period of three months after the prospectus becomes effective in the
issuer's home market.2 47 Any material changes after the effective date
would be disclosed in the Global Form.
IV. SOME OF THE PROBLEMS wiTH HARMONIZATION
The majority of this article is devoted to discussing the form and
content of the proposed harmonized standards. Harmonization, how-
ever, is not a perfect solution. 48 This part identifies four of the most
significant problems associated with the harmonization of disclosure
rules. First, there are the costs of governmental intervention that have
to be weighed against the advantages of harmonization. Second, we
must consider the cultural and structural differences among nations,
which might hinder the creation and implementation of efficient dis-
closure standards. Third, there are the transition costs incurred by
market participants and regulators as a result of the changes in the
244. In the United States, depositary facilities are called ADRs (American Deposi-
tary Receipts). An ADR is a certificate issued by a U.S. depositary bank representing
shares of a non-U.S. company deposited with the bank or its custodian. See Joseph
Velli, American Depositary Receipts: An Overview, 17 Fordham Int'l L.J. S38, S39
(1994). For a description of the different forms and uses of ADRs, see id. at S43-50
(describing the different kinds of ADRs used by foreign issuers to enter U.S. capital
markets).
245. Such information includes: (i) a conversion ratio; (ii) the voting procedures;
(iii) collection and distribution of dividends; (iv) transmission of information; (v) sale
or exercise of rights; (vi) deposit or sale of securities resulting from dividends, stock
splits or reorganization; (vii) amendment, extension, and termination of the deposit;
(viii) inspection rights; (ix) restrictions on the right to deposit or withdraw the under-
lying securities; and (x) limitations upon the liability of the depositary. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.202(0(2) (1997).
246. Information regarding the method of distribution and the underwriting ar-
rangement for purely domestic offerings would be provided in the Basic Form.
247. When securities are not offered in the issuer's home country, the effective date
refers to the end of the review process of the Basic Form by the local authority. For a
discussion of the review process of the Global Prospectus and mutual recognition, see
supra part II.C.2.
248. It is doubtful that we would be able to identify a perfect rule even if we were
to see one. While we may not agree, however, on the content of perfect rules, we
should look for a process that is likely to produce such rules. See Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition
in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1437, 1506-07 (1992).
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regulatory regime. Finally, there may be resistance by certain interest
groups who fear losing their power or commercial advantage.
A. The Costs of Governmental Intervention
Harmonization can be characterized as a form of governmental in-
tervention that replaces the current regime of competition among na-
tions. Just as market failures occur in regulatory competition,
governmental failures affect its intervention in the markets. As a re-
sult, such failures might cause a decrease in market efficiency when
the government intervenes in the operation of markets.
It is important to note that the area of securities disclosure is al-
ready subject to governmental intervention. In fact, there is no securi-
ties market in the world that is not subject to some form of
regulation.249 The need for such a mandatory disclosure system has
been demonstrated by many scholars.25 The reality of existing gov-
ernmental intervention, and the economic need for such intervention,
reduces the effects of governmental failures on the process of
harmonization.
1. Lack of Information and Incentive
Decision-making based on inadequate information can be very
costly."5 In a regulatory competition regime, participants provide
regulators with important information on the optimal rules through
their decisions to operate in, or exit from, a certain market ("the exit
mechanism")5 2 For example, in the 1970s, the development of the
Eurobond market as an alternative to the U.S. market put competitive
pressure on what was an excessive U.S. regulatory burden.5 3 The de-
regulation of the American securities registration system in the early
249. See generally International Securities Regulation (Robert C. Rosen ed., 1997)
(providing a description of securities regulation in most securities markets).
250. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 Va. L. Rev. 717 (1984) (making the case for a
mandatory disclosure system based upon the characteristics of information as a public
good and the inefficiency of self-induced mechanisms); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 Va. L
Rev. 669, 697-98 (1984) (describing the third party effects whose control requires a
mandatory disclosure system).
251. See White, supra note 55, at 20 (describing the difficulties government agencies
may face in trying to obtain accurate information).
252. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International
Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 Fordham L Rev. 1855, 1870-72
(1997) (describing the race-to-the-top model of regulatory competition); John C. Cof-
fee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation. The Significance of Organizational Struc-
ture in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 Bus. Law. 447, 453 (1995) (describing
how the fear of market participants exiting theoretically produces regulation that dis-
courages migration); Cox, supra note 46, at 159-60 (explaining regulatory competition
in securities regulation).
253. See Maura B. Perry, Note, A Challenge Postponed: Market 2000 Complacency
in Response to Regulatory Competition for International Equity Markets, 34 Va. J. Int'l
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1980s, through integrated disclosure and shelf registration, was par-
tially motivated by this competitive pressure. The reduction of the
regulatory burden on foreign issuers in 1994 was also a response to
competitive pressure from London. 4 Without the information pro-
vided by regulatory competition, rules developed by bureaucrats
might be designed to enhance their own powers, rather than the effi-
ciency of the market. 5
There is no way to measure how important competition is for re-
straining excessive regulation; however, several factors limit the effec-
tiveness of the exit mechanism. First, the information provided by the
exit mechanism is incomplete because market participants are system-
atically underinformed- s6 It is also biased because it identifies the
desires of those who make the multinational offering decisions,
namely managers, whose interests are not always similar to those of
the shareholders." s7 The second factor is that regulatory and non-reg-
ulatory barriers limit the mobility of market participants, making the
operation of the exit mechanism partially ineffective. 58 Third, regula-
tors are likely to be better informed of changes in the global market
through the mechanisms of the Global Coordinator than by operating
individually. 5 9 Finally, the officials of the Global Regulator would
not have the incentive that domestic regulators have to offer lax dis-
closure rules or ignore positive externalities in order to attract issuers
to a specific market.2 "'
Another argument used by advocates of regulatory competition is
that government personnel lack the profit incentive of private enti-
L. 701, 703-04 (1994) (explaining how the United States's costly and uncompetitive
regulatory policy resulted in market participants' leaving for Europe).
254. See Simplification of Registration and Reporting Requirements for Foreign
Companies: Safe Harbors for Public Announcements of Unregistered Offerings and
Broker-Dealer Research Reports, Securities Act Release No. 7053, [1993-94 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,331, at 85,206 (Apr. 19, 1994). Both the re-
forms of the 1980s and the changes made in 1994 focus on the process of the offering,
rather than on the content of the disclosure documents. They both, however, demon-
strate the operation of the regulatory competition mechanism.
255. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 252, at 1890-91 (describing the problems with
cooperative agreements among securities regulators).
256. See Geiger, supra note 4, at 275-76 (exploring the effects of the cost of infor-
mation on investors' decisions).
257. See Bebchuk, supra note 248, at 1458-84 (analyzing the problem of managerial
opportunism in connection with states' competition for corporate charters).
258. See Coffee, supra note 252, at 453-54 (describing the assumptions underlying
regulatory competition theory); Geiger, supra note 4, at 276-80 (analyzing the lack of
mobility among securities markets).
259. Through the Global Coordinator, regulators of all markets are to share infor-
mation on an ongoing basis and monitor the operation of all markets.
260. See Bebchuk, supra note 248, at 1501-02 (comparing the motives of state and
federal officials to offer concessions to managers); Geiger, supra note 4, at 290-97
(analyzing the race to the bottom and externalities problems in connection with regu-
latory competition in the securities markets).
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ties. 6' They argue that this, combined with the difficulties that gov-
ernments face in attracting highly skilled individuals, results in
ineffective performance. 262 However, this argument does not meet
the reality test. Our experience with the SEC shows that a govern-
ment agency can function efficiently and attract highly skilled individ-
uals, notwithstanding the lack of private market incentive.263
Furthermore, as discussed above,264 securities markets are already
regulated by government officials. There is no reason to believe that
the officials of the Global Coordinator would be any less motivated or
skilled than the officials of domestic regulators.
Finally, it is important to note that even if the lack of competitive
pressure resulted in less than optimal common standards, harmoniza-
tion would still be superior to the current regulatory regime. To im-
prove aggregate social welfare, and to perform better than regulatory
competition, the common standards need not be perfect. Harmoniza-
tion would be successful if the new standards are more efficient than
the average efficiency level of current domestic disclosure standards in
the Major Markets.
2. Lack of Common Goals
Harmonization would require compromises among regulators hold-
ing different views on the desirability of certain standards.265 The
quality of the common standards could be negatively affected by this
negotiation process. Although domestic regulators share the same ba-
sic goals of protecting investors and maintaining market integrity,
their interpretations on how to achieve them could be conflicting and
thus, difficult to implement. 66 Countries may differ in their ap-
proaches to specific issues and the priorities they give them. As a re-
sult, the negotiation process would involve "give and take" which
might result in suboptimal rules. Furthermore, small countries might
prefer to set the harmonized standards at a low level so they can ex-
ternalize the effects of such disclosure to countries with large invest-
261. See, e.g., White, supra note 55, at 19 (describing the weak incentives of govern-
ment agencies).
262. See id at 19-20.
263. One of the main reasons for the United States's market strength is the fairness
and integrity of the market ensured by the operation of the SEC. See, eg., Breeden,
supra note 56, at S81-82 (describing the public confidence and market integrity pre-
served by the SEC as the most important factors in the U.S. competitive position);
James R. Doty, The Role of the Securities and Exclange Commission in an Interna-
tionalized Marketplace, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S77, S78 (1992) (explaining that the SEC
was created by Congress to ensure that U.S. markets are fair and efficient and that
U.S. investors are treated fairly).
264. See supra text accompanying note 249.
265. See supra text accompanying note 119.
266. White, supra note 55, at 19 (describing how a government agent might be buf-
feted by diffuse goals).
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ment communities. 267 Others might look for the private advantages of
competition and try to attract market participants by offering lax dis-
closure.268 To prevent such "cheating," strong economic, political, and
moral commitments must be developed among the member states.269
There is no doubt that the negotiation process might result in ineffi-
cient standards. However, as demonstrated in this article, a compro-
mise is possible and a set of specific rules could be drawn from the
common goals of protecting investors and promoting market effi-
ciency. The mechanism of the Global Coordinator would ensure that
those rules were implemented and interpreted in a unified way.2
The desire of small countries to harmonize at a low level would face
the qualified majority mechanism of the Global Coordinator.2 71 The
"cheating" problem is most likely to involve nations that do not par-
ticipate in the Global Coordinator, not those developed countries that
are voluntary participants. Because the regulators of all Major Mar-
kets are expected to participate in the Global Coordinator,272 the neg-
ative effect of nonmembers' efforts to attract market participants by
offering lax disclosure would be marginal, if any.
3. Rent-Seeking Behavior
Economic regulation literature emphasizes the influence that inter-
ested entities have on regulatory agencies.2 7 3 Rent-seeking occurs
when individuals who are most affected by governmental action seek
to influence the regulatory process in order to obtain the most
favorable outcomes for themselves. The success of those individu-
als in "capturing" an agency comes at the expense of the general pub-
lic.2 75 However, the rent-seeking argument should not prevent the
progress toward harmonization. Rent-seeking is more likely to influ-
ence domestic regulators than an international organization such as
the Global Coordinator, which has no connection to the specific clien-
267. Externalities occur when one state's actions affect another state's well-being,
and the relevant costs are not reflected in the market price. Tyler Cowen, Public
Goods and Externalities, in The Fortune Encyclopedia of Economics 74, 75 (David R.
Henderson ed., 1993).
268. See Geiger, supra note 4, at 283-95 (discussing managerial opportunism and
the race to the bottom in the context of securities disclosure).
269. White, supra note 55, at 41 (exploring the feasibility of harmonization).
270. For a discussion of these mechanisms, see part II.D.2-3.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
272. Currently, the regulators of the Major Markets are participating in the devel-
opment of the IOSCO Proposal. See supra note 5.
273. See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J.
Econ. 3 (1971) (describing how regulators become representative of their clientele).
274. Coffee, supra note 252, at 473-74 (describing rent seeking behavior and agency
"capture").
275. Each member of the general public suffers only a fraction of the total loss to
the public, thus, finding it too expensive to oppose the rent seeking process. See
White, supra note 55, at 21.
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tele of any individual nation.276 Furthermore, large organizations are
considered better protected from "capture." 277 Hence, the Global
Regulator would be less exposed to rent seeking than domestic regu-
latory agencies that currently regulate securities markets.
4. Static Structure
Even when harmonized standards are formed, it will take a long
time until they are implemented. 78 By then, economic conditions
might have changed, causing the unified standards to become out-
dated and making renegotiation necessary.2 79 Indeed, a static struc-
ture would surely render the harmonized standards inefficient.
However, the monitoring and decision-making mechanisms of the
Global Coordinator are specifically designed to prevent such stagna-
tion and to promote a dynamic regulation process.' The voting
mechanism of the Global Coordinator eliminates the risk of deadlock,
ensures that decisions are taken promptly, and allocates the votes
among the member states in proportion to the size of their securities
markets. The monitoring and dispute-resolution mechanisms ensure
that the Global Coordinator could respond to economic changes
within a short time frame, and that the common rules are being inter-
preted and enforced equally in all member states. Arguably, the
Global Coordinator's mechanisms would be no slower than those of
domestic regulators.
B. Cultural and Structural Differences
Differences in market and regulatory structure present some of the
greatest challenges to the process of harmonization. The harmonized
rules have to be flexible enough to be useful in various market struc-
276. A possible example of a domestic agency that represents its clientele is the
Japanese Ministry of Finance. The close relationship between the Ministry of Fi-
nance, which regulates the Japanese securities market, and its clientele might be the
explanation for the scandals which have been unfolding in the Japanese financial in-
dustry in recent years. See James D. Cox, Regulatory, Competition in Securities Mar-
kets: An Approach for Reconciling Japanese and United States Disclosure
Philosophies, 16 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 149, 151-52 (1993) (describing the
strong connection between the Ministry of Finance and financial institutions); An-
drew Pollack, Japan Considers Opening the Veiled Corporate Ledger, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 5, 1997, at D1 (describing recent scandals in Japan and the connection between
these scandals and the structure of Japan's regulatory regime).
277. Coffee, supra note 252, at 474-75 (exploring the connection between agency
"capture" and organizational size).
278. See Lewis D. Solomon & Louise Corso, The Impact of Technology on the Trad-
ing of Securities: The Emerging Global Market and the Implications for Regulation, 24
J. Marshall L. Rev. 299, 331-32 (1991) (describing the criticism of harmonization due
to the long time it takes to negotiate and implement harmonized standards).
279. Gunnar Schuster, Extraterritoriality of Securities Laws: An Economic Analysis
of Jurisdictional Conflicts, 26 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 165, 194 (1994) (referring to the
static structure of the harmonized system as a significant disadvantage).
280. See supra part II.D.2-3.
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tures, yet not provide too much discretion, which could reduce their
credibility and uniformity.2 8'
1. Differences in Market Structure
Differences in market structure and corporate ownership presuma-
bly result in differing demands for corporate disclosure.282 The differ-
ence between the U.S. corporate ownership model and that of the
Japanese and German markets illustrates this phenomenon. 83 In the
United States, share ownership is divided among many individuals
and institutions.28 In contrast, Japanese companies are divided into
business groups (keiretsu) whose members usually own about half of
each others' equity." 5 Only a small fraction of each company's equity
is publicly traded, and only 24% of that fraction is held by retail inves-
tors. 6 In Germany, the securities market is traditionally considered
insignificant and is barely regulated.287 Financial institutions, not the
securities market, supply most of the capital needs of local companies.
The financial institutions use this dependency to impose significant
control over corporate governance.2 8 This ownership model, and the
interaction between executives of German and Japanese companies
with their major shareholders,289 allegedly results in less demand for
corporate disclosure.
Different market structures do not necessarily imply different dis-
closure levels. An adequate level of information is needed by all in-
vestors to make efficient investment decisions. The fact that some
investors enjoy access to inside information because they hold a large
281. Mercado, supra note 55, at 348 (describing the effect of differing circumstances
in various countries on the development of the IAS).
282. See, e.g., Michael A. Schneider, Foreign Listings and the Preeminence of U.S.
Securities Exchanges: Should the SEC Recognize Foreign Accounting Standards?, 3
Minn. J. Global Trade 301, 335 (1994) (alleging that the capital market structure of
many foreign nations minimizes the demand for disclosure).
283. For a detailed discussion of differences in corporate structure, see Mark J.
Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United
States, 102 Yale L.J. 1927 (1993).
284. For the classic story of the separation of ownership and control in the large
public corporation, see Adolf Berle & Gardiner Means, The Modem Corporation and
Private Property (1932).
285. See Roe, supra note 283, at 1939-41 (describing the structure of the Japanese
market).
286. U.S. Competitiveness and Trade Policy in the Global Economy: Hearing
Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong., 129, 130
(1994) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, Concerning International Markets and Individual Investors [hereinafter Levitt].
In contrast, in the United States, about 50% of stock is individually held. Id.
287. Roquette, supra note 8, at 599-613 (describing the German capital market and
recent reforms).
288. Schneider, supra note 282, at 335-36 (discussing the capital market structure of
Japan and Germany).
289. Roe, supra note 283, at 1941-46 (exploring structured interaction in
Germany).
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block of equity in a company should not prevent regulators from in-
sisting that adequate levels of information be supplied to the market.
In fact, both Japan and Germany are currently undertaking efforts to
improve their disclosure systems. In the face of recent scandals, Japan
is struggling to improve corporate disclosure, enhance market integ-
rity, and become a competitor of the United States and United King-
dom in the global market.29g Germany reformed its disclosure regime
as part of the harmonization of the EU disclosure rules.291
Another factor that is mentioned as an obstacle to harmonization is
the level of involvement of banks in the securities industry. In the
United States and Japan, separate institutions engage in banking and
securities activities. In other countries, such as Germany and Switzer-
land, banks play a major role in the securities market ("universal
banking system"). 292 Pursuant to the universal banking system, the
same supervisory authority oversees the banking and securities activi-
ties of banks;293 however, two facts make the "universal banking" ar-
gument immaterial. First, the artificial barriers between banking and
securities activities are disappearing both in the United States 94 and
in Japan.295 Second, the applicability of the unified disclosure stan-
dards is to be based on the substance of the activity rather than the
identity of the regulated entity, making any distinctions in financial
institutions immaterial.
2. Differences in Regulatory Structure
Governments, statutory agencies, and self regulatory organizations
(SROs) regulate the various markets. In the United States, the SEC,
a statutory agency, is entrusted with regulating the securities market.
The Japanese market is regulated by the Ministry of Finance, 296 while
in the United Kingdom, the LSE, an SRO, establishes the rules gov-
erning listing and periodic disclosure.2 9 7
290. Pollack, supra note 276, at Dl.
291. For discussion of the EU harmonization plan, see supra part I.A.
292. Solomon & Corso, supra note 278, at 329 (describing the nature of financial
institutions used to market securities).
293. Id
294. See Regulatory Reform in Transition: The Dismantling of the Glass-Steagall
Act, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 545 (1995) (discussing the increased difficulty in separating
banking and securities activities).
295. In November 1996, the Japanese Prime Minister announced a plan to deregu-
late Japan's capital market. This plan includes the lowering of the wall between the
securities and commercial banking industries. See Sheryl WuDunn, Japan Announces
New Plan to Deregulate Financial Markets, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1996, at D9.
296. Cox, supra note 276, at 151-52 (describing securities regulation in Japan).
297. See Jay D. Hansen, London Calling?: A Comparison of London and U.S.
Stock Exchange Listing Requirements for Foreign Equity Securities, 6 Duke J. Comp.
& Int'l L. 197, 212-17 (1995) (describing the regulatory framework in the United
Kingdom). The United Kingdom is currently reforming its securities and banking
regulations. Following the reform, the securities and banking industries would be reg-
ulated by a single governmental agency.
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The variety of regulatory bodies should not hinder the implementa-
tion of the harmonized rules. Under the proposed framework of the
Global Regulator, each nation would preserve its sovereignty in
choosing the method of implementing the standards into local law.
Furthermore, the Global Coordinator would not replace local regula-
tory bodies in supervising domestic markets. Each nation would des-
ignate a "competent authority" to carry out the various regulatory
functions. The organizational form of this entity is irrelevant to the
effectiveness of the harmonization process.
C. Transition Costs
The current regulatory regime developed in a period when cross-
border securities transactions were rare. This led to the creation of
domestic regulatory systems which essentially operate independently
of one another. The theme of this article is that a regulatory change is
required to adapt these regulatory systems to the new global securities
market. However, any change in government regulation imposes
transition costs on those who relied upon the old rules and took ac-
tions with long-term consequences. 298 A move from the current regu-
latory regime to a set of common rules might disrupt the investments
made by market participants, professionals, and regulators in current
market practices.2 99 Even if harmonization is a more efficient solution
for the regulation of the global securities market, as this article claims,
it is not necessarily worthwhile to radically change the current sys-
tem.300 This section analyzes the transition costs of harmonization
from the standpoints of various parties.
1. Investors' and Professionals' Perspectives
Investors, creditors, accountants, and lawyers would have to be-
come familiar with a new set of rules. These people have invested a
significant amount of resources in acquiring the skills needed to pre-
pare and analyze disclosure documents. Changing the standards
would require them to undertake a learning process that would have
both direct and indirect costs. The direct costs are the actual costs of
acquiring the same level of knowledge and skills that they possess with
respect to the current standards. The indirect costs include slower
298. For a detailed discussion of transition costs, see Louis Kaplow, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 509 (1986).
299. See David Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate
Law Rules: An American Perspective on the "Race to the Bottom" in the European
Communities, 32 Harv. Int'l L.J. 423, 445-46 (1991) (providing an analysis of the tran-
sition costs involved in harmonization).
300. This argument follows the semi-strong form path dependence. See Mark J.
Roe, Chaos and Evaluation in Law and Economics, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 641, 648-50
(1996) (explaining that in some situations, the cost of restructuring a system that has
developed over a long time outweighs the efficiency that is achieved from this
restructuring).
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process preparation and analysis of disclosure documents, the inevita-
ble mistakes during the learning process, and possible misallocation of
capital as a result of incomplete familiarity with the standards during
the transition period. It is difficult to estimate the size and effects of
these costs. However, there are several mitigating factors. The transi-
tional costs are a one-time event. When market participants are famil-
iar with the new standards, they will enjoy significant economies of
scale resulting from the need to learn how to deal with only one set of
rules.3 ' This reduction of costs would result in ongoing savings for
both current market participants and new players that would have to
study only one standard to begin with.
2. Issuers' Perspective
For issuers, the new rules mean not only a different format of re-
porting but also different substance. Issuers would have to bear at
least part of the costs of professionals becoming familiar with the new
standards through increased fees and a slower process of preparing
registration and reporting documents. Issuers from markets which
currently impose disclosure requirements that are less stringent than
those of the unified standards would face a more severe problem.
Those issuers would incur costs of reporting information that was not
required when they made the decision to offer their stock publicly.
For most issuers, the overall reduction in the cost of capital that
would result from harmonization is likely to outweigh the additional
transition costs they might incur. However, to mitigate the transition
effect, a limited grandfathering exemption could be provided.' For
one year following the implementation of the harmonized standards
for periodic reporting, those standards would not apply to issuers that
had offered their stock publicly before the implementation of the har-
monized rules. During this year, the market would adjust to the har-
monized rules and professionals would become familiar with them.
This would allow issuers to save on transition costs and to develop a
strategy of operation.
3. Regulators' Perspective
Domestic supervisory agencies that would implement the harmo-
nized standards might incur significant costs during the transition pe-
riod.303 First, regulators would have to invest a great deal of capital
301. For a discussion of the advantages of harmonization for investors, see Geiger,
supra note 4, at 307-10 (exploring the reduction in the cost of capital and the en-
hanced comparability that would result from harmonization).
302. A grandfathering exemption is commonly employed when a regulatory change
is implemented. Such a provision exempts pre-reform investments from newly en-
acted laws. See Kaplow, supra note 298, at 584-87.
303. For the political aspects of harmonization and the potential resistance of regu-
latory agencies, see infra text accompanying notes 305-09.
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and human resources in developing the rules. Then, the staff would
have to be retrained under the new rules. In addition to the retraining
costs, there would be costs for sub-optimal monitoring and review
processes during the transition period. The same problems also apply
to the mechanisms of the Global Coordinator. It would take some
time before the institutional mechanisms of the Global Coordinator
could perform its tasks efficiently.30" This problem would occur at a
critical time, while the markets were adjusting to the new rules. How-
ever, the effects of this one-time transition period should not be over-
stated. Regulators are accustomed to dealing with regulatory reforms,
are trained to handle them, and should therefore be able to overcome
these challenges.
D. Resistance by Interest Groups
Public choice theory suggests that political incumbents-those who
are protected by the current regulatory regime-would resist any
change. Incumbents usually exert their influence over political institu-
tions to maintain their own power and to block change." 5 This sec-
tion analyzes the use of political power by several interest groups that
might oppose the adoption of harmonized disclosure rules, and the
potential influence of these groups on the process of harmonization.
The first group is domestic regulators. Economic regulation theory
suggests that regulators behave like managers of private firms, seeking
to maximize the "value," or power, of their agencies. Individual regu-
latory agencies compete over this "value."30 6 In this respect, the
Global Coordinator poses a potential threat to domestic regulators.
Although it would not replace domestic agencies, the Global Coordi-
nator would take over some of the powers that those agencies seek to
maximize. However, without the cooperation of domestic regulators
such as the SEC, no significant regulatory reform can be achieved.
While there is no sure way to predict the possible objections that do-
mestic agencies might raise, two factors should mitigate their opposi-
tion to harmonization. First, domestic regulators would still hold
monitoring and enforcement powers in their home markets. More-
over, they would continue to perform review functions, and mutual
recognition of foreign prospectuses which would not be possible until
the documents had been cleared by their respective domestic authori-
304. Another source of costs is the actual cost of establishing and operating the
institutional mechanisms of the Global Coordinator.
305. See Roe, supra note 300, at 651-52 (suggesting that even when an alternate
solution exists and its efficiency exceeds the transition costs, incumbents might use
their power to maintain the current status quo).
306. See Edward J. Kane, Tension Between Competition and Coordination in Inter-
national Financial Regulation, in Governing Banking's Future: Market vs. Regulation
33, 34 (Catherine England ed., 1991).
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ties.3"7 Second, the increased level of activity in the securities market
that would result from harmonization is likely to enhance the "value"
which regulatory agencies try to maximize. The demonstrated willing-
ness of the regulators of all Major Markets to work together toward
the development of international standards within the framework of
the IOSCO may be a sign that regulators would be receptive to
harmonization.0 8
Another group that might oppose the harmonized standards is do-
mestic U.S. issuers, who might resist streamlining the access of foreign
firms to the U.S. capital market. This resistance would likely be
strong if foreign firms' access to the U.S. market were based on disclo-
sure standards that were less stringent than those imposed on domes-
tic firms, as suggested in the IOSCO proposal. 3 9 The proposal
contained in this article, however, advocates the development of uni-
fied standards to be used by both domestic and foreign issuers. Such
standards would not put U.S. issuers at a competitive disadvantage in
their home market. Thus, they are not likely to raise strong political
objections on this point.
Finally, opposition is expected from issuers in countries that cur-
rently employ a lax disclosure regime. Those issuers would incur sig-
nificant transition costs if the new rules were implemented. For them,
a limited grandfathering exemption and a simple delisting mechanism
could be provided.
CONCLUSION
The globalization of the world securities market promises a more
efficient and diversified global economy. At the same time, globaliza-
tion increases the challenges facing the regulators of securities mar-
kets worldwide. This article suggests a regime of harmonized
disclosure standards to govern the world's securities markets. This
proposal provides an alternative to the current regime of domestic dis-
closure requirements and to the IOSCO's proposed international dis-
closure standards.
The second part of this article presents two existing models of har-
monization, the EU harmonization plan and the United States/Cana-
dian MIDS. It identifies the shortfalls of those models. The third part
of this article analyzes alternative structures and forms of harmoniza-
tion and makes the case for the use of a common disclosure standard
307. For a discussion of the review process of the Global Prospectus, see supra part
II.C.2.
308. See ISOCO Proposal, supra note 5; see also Levitt, supra note 286, at 132 (ex-
pressing the SEC's support for the developments of international disclosure standards
within the framework of IOSCO). However, IOSCO does not pose a "threat" to the
agencies' powers because all its decisions are made unanimously and are not binding
upon the member states. See Guy, supra note 83, at 296-97.
309. See supra text accompanying note 67.
1998] 1835
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
for both domestic and multinational offerings. The third part also pro-
vides a detailed description of the scope and structure of the disclo-
sure document (the Global Prospectus) and its review process. This
part further describes the institutional framework and powers of the
Global Coordinator, which would be entrusted with the harmoniza-
tion of securities disclosure rules.
The fourth part of this article provides a comparative analysis of the
disclosure requirements in the world's Major Markets. Based upon
this comparison, this part shows that harmonization is feasible, and
suggests a set of unified standards. The last part identifies the possible
problems with the proposed model and suggests solutions.
The object of this article is not to provide a complete or perfect
model of harmonization. Rather, it is a modest attempt to present a
model that can serve as the basis for additional work to be undertaken
by regulators, academics, and practitioners. Developing and imple-
menting harmonized rules will be a difficult task; however, when this
task is completed and a harmonized system is implemented, a much
more efficient capital market can result.
1836 [Vol. 66
